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Abstract
References to gravity are threaded throughout the Rome Statute’s provisions relating to juris-
diction and its exercise. These references reflect the drafters’ philosophical vision for the Court,
but fail to provide the institution with clear legal guidance. Part II begins by examining the relevant
statutory provisions, exploring ambiguities in the text and suggesting how it should be interpreted.
It then canvases the legislative history for indications of the drafters’ intent and evaluates the ap-
proaches to gravity adopted thus far by the Court’s judges and Prosecutor. The analysis in this
Part demonstrates that gravity plays two essential and distinct roles for the ICC. First, it serves
as a statutorily required “threshold” below which the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction.
The Prosecutor must consider this threshold in selecting situations and cases and the judges are
required to reject cases below the threshold when the issue is properly raised. The second role
relates to the Prosecutor’s discretion. In addition to considering the gravity threshold, the Statute’s
emphasis on gravity strongly suggests the Prosecutor should consider relative gravity in selecting
among situations and cases above the threshold. The task of implementing the concept of gravity,
both as a threshold and as a relative consideration in the exercise of discretion, requires an under-
standing of the theoretical bases for gravity’s prominent place in the ICC regime. Part III therefore
turns to the justifications for the gravity threshold and discretionary relative gravity considera-
tions, rooting them in the Court’s moral and sociological legitimacy. The study of institutional
legitimacy is a vast and rapidly growing field of scholarly inquiry. This Article does not seek to
contribute to that literature, but rather employs extant accounts of legitimacy to demonstrate the
relationship between gravity and the ICC’s actual and perceived legitimacy. The Article argues
that gravity acts to legitimize the Court in two interrelated ways: the gravity threshold helps to en-
sure the moral legitimacy of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and the Prosecutor’s discretionary
use of relative gravity strongly affects perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. These observations
about gravity’s role in legitimizing the ICC lead to some important conclusions in Part IV about
how the Court should operationalize gravity in its work. With regard to gravity threshold deter-
minations, a relatively straightforward factor-based analysis is suggested. The Article sets forth
the relevant factors and argues that only cases scoring at the bottom of the gravity spectrum on all
factors should be excluded based on the gravity threshold.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of gravity or seriousness1 resides at the epicen-
ter of the legal regime of the International Criminal Court
("Court" or "ICC"). The Court's founding document, the Rome
Statute of the ICC ("Rome Statute" or "Statute"), declares as the
Court's purpose to end impunity for "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole. '2 The Stat-
ute describes these crimes as "unimaginable atrocities," and
"grave crimes" that "deeply shock the conscience of humanity. '
The Court's jurisdiction is restricted to "the most serious crimes"
and the judges are to reject as inadmissible crimes "not of suffi-
cient gravity."4 Thus, the concept of gravity is central to the
ICC's purpose and its application will be an integral part of the
Court's work.
The ICC's emphasis on gravity reflects the importance of
this concept in international criminal law more generally.5 Poli-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law, beginning
July 2009; Ph.D candidate, Irish Center for Human Rights; J.D., Yale Law School;
M.A.L.D., The Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy; B.S.F.S. Georgetown University
School of Foreign Service. I am indebted to the following people for helpful comments
on earlier drafts or insightful discussions of topics raised herein: William N. Eskridge,
Hurst Hannum, Kevin Jon Heller, David J. Luban, Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Jaya Ramji-
Nogales, W. Michael Reisman, Darryl Robinson, Alvaro Santos, AmyJ. Sepinwall, Wil-
liam A. Schabas, Dinah Shelton, ScottJ. Shapiro, David P. Stewart, Beth Van Schaack
and the participants in the 2008 Irish Center for Human Rights PhD Seminar, the 2008
Junior International Law Scholars Workshop, and the 2008 Georgetown Summer
Faculty Workshop.
1. Gravity and seriousness are used synonymously herein. See OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (emphasis added). This Article focuses on the
importance of seriousness, leaving to the side the issue of what other factors contribute
to crimes being "of concern to the international community as a whole." For a discus-
sion of that question, see, for example, BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 44-
51 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2003); RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK,
ESSENTIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 107-19 (2008).
3. Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.
4. Id. art. 17.
5. The term "international criminal law" is employed herein in its narrow sense,
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ticians invoke gravity in establishing international criminal
courts and in explaining their support for such courts;6 interna-
tional criminal tribunals cite the gravity of the offenses before
them in justifying their jurisdiction;7 and academic endeavors on
international criminal law refer to their subject matter by its
gravity, using such terms as the "most serious crimes, '"8 "extreme
evil,"' and "mass atrocities."'
Yet despite the acknowledged centrality of gravity to inter-
national criminal law, there is virtually no discussion in academic
orjudicial sources of the theoretical basis and doctrinal contours
of this concept. 1 This silence stems in part from an understand-
able reluctance to rank or quantify extreme human suffering.
How can one delimit "mass atrocities" or "grave harm"? Must
referring to the body of law concerning the "core crimes" prescribed in the Rome Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome Statute" or "Statute") (aggression, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide), in contrast with broader usages, which
can include any crime that is the subject of an international cooperative regime, such as
counterfeiting currency or cutting submarine cables. For a discussion of the various
usages of "international criminal law," see BROOMHALL, supra note 2, at 9-24.
6. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 27th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/61/PV.27 (Oct. 9, 2006). Addressing the General Assembly on behalf of African
Member States to the International Criminal Court Statute, Mr. Sabelo Sivuyile Ma-
qungo stated:
The horrors of crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia
and in Sierra Leone and the genocide committed in Rwanda brought to the
fore the sad fact that sometimes national justice systems are just not enough to
deter or prosecute crimes that are of the greatest seriousness to the interna-
tional community. Therefore, there is a need for the international commu-
nity to augment these national justice systems when they are unable or unwill-
ing to act.
Id.
7. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 57 (Oct. 2, 1995) (holding that the jurisdiction
of the international tribunal was justified in part because "of the nature of the offences
alleged against Appellant, offences which, if proven, do not affect the interests of one
State alone but shock the conscience of mankind.").
8. BROOMHALL, supra note 2, at 10.
9. MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 (2007).
10. CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, GLOBALIZINGJUSTICE FOR MASS ATROCITIES: A REVOLU-
TION IN ACCOUNTABILITY iX (2005).
11. Scholarly works analyzing the Rome Statute generally contain little or no dis-
cussion of the gravity threshold. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE (Otto
Triffterer ed., 1999); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE (Roy S. Lee ed., 2008); THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
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there be millions of victims before the international community
will adjudicate the crimes? Thousands? Hundreds? What about
one crime committed for particularly heinous reasons? There
are no satisfactory answers to such questions.
The undertheorization of gravity is also due to the historical
evolution of international criminal law as a response to atrocities
that were undeniably grave. There was no questioning that the
systematic slaughter of six million Jews was an exceptionally seri-
ous crime. The Nuremberg trials represent, in part, an expres-
sion of that universal moraljudgment. Subsequent international
and internationalized12 criminal tribunals have addressed crimes
evoking similar levels of moral condemnation-large-scale "eth-
nic cleansing" in Former Yugoslavia, genocides claiming close to
one and two million lives respectively in Rwanda and Cambodia,
and tens of thousands killed and tortured in Sierra Leone and
East Timor.13 Historically, there has been little need to explain
the concept of "grave crimes" meriting international adjudica-
tion because, in the famous words U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Potter Stewart used in reference to pornography, we "know it
when [we] see it."14
For the ICC, however, the concept of gravity has taken
center stage because, unlike its predecessor tribunals, the ICC's
jurisdiction is not limited to particular conflicts. Instead, as a
standing court, the ICC makes its own determinations about
which situations and cases merit international adjudication.1 5
Gravity is at the heart of those determinations and, as a result,
the task of developing appropriate theoretical and doctrinal ap-
proaches to gravity has gained new urgency. The Court has
taken only a few faltering steps toward elaborating a gravity juris-
prudence and policy, and academic analysis remains sparse.
This Article seeks to fill that gap by proposing a theoretical
framework for understanding the roles of gravity in the ICC re-
12. "Internationalized tribunals" include the "hybrid" courts, such as the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
that blend national and international elements in various proportions.
13. The tribunals created to address these crimes are, respectively: the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, and the Serious Crimes Panels of the District Court in Dili.
14. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, P., concurring).
15. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2.
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gime, and suggesting prescriptive approaches that flow from that
framework.
References to gravity are threaded throughout the Rome
Statute's provisions relating to jurisdiction and its exercise.1 6
These references reflect the drafters' philosophical vision for the
Court, but fail to provide the institution with clear legal gui-
dance. Part II begins by examining the relevant statutory provi-
sions, exploring ambiguities in the text and suggesting how it
should be interpreted. It then canvases the legislative history for
indications of the drafters' intent and evaluates the approaches
to gravity adopted thus far by the Court's judges and Prosecutor.
The analysis in this Part demonstrates that gravity plays two
essential and distinct roles for the ICC. First, it serves as a statu-
torily required "threshold" below which the Court should not
exercise its jurisdiction. The Prosecutor must consider this
threshold in selecting situations and cases and the judges are re-
quired to reject cases below the threshold when the issue is prop-
erly raised. The second role relates to the Prosecutor's discre-
tion. In addition to considering the gravity threshold, the Stat-
ute's emphasis on gravity strongly suggests the Prosecutor should
consider relative gravity in selecting among situations and cases
above the threshold.
The Court lacks the resources needed to pursue all admissi-
ble situations and cases, and the task of selecting where to focus
the Court's resources falls essentially to the Prosecutor. The
Statute is largely silent as to how the Prosecutor should make
selection decisions. In fact, the provisions of the Statute leave
some doubt as to when the Prosecutor has discretion to reject
situations and cases. Nonetheless, the regime's focus on gravity
leaves little doubt that relative seriousness should inform at least
some of the Prosecutor's most important decisions. In other
words, in exercising his discretion to select and reject situations
and cases, the Prosecutor should consider, among other things,
the degree of gravity each situation or case presents in relation
to others the Court might pursue.
16. See LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 124 (2002);
Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Gravity Threshold Under the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 19 CiuM. L. F. 35, 35 (2008); Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International Crimi-
nal Court, 17 CRIM. L. F. 281, 294 (2006). The gravity of the crime is also a sentencing
factor, a use that is not examined herein. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 78(0).
14032009]
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The task of implementing the concept of gravity, both as a
threshold and as a relative consideration in the exercise of dis-
cretion, requires an understanding of the theoretical bases for
gravity's prominent place in the ICC regime. Part III therefore
turns to the justifications for the gravity threshold and discre-
tionary relative gravity considerations, rooting them in the
Court's moral and sociological legitimacy. The study of institu-
tional legitimacy is a vast and rapidly growing field of scholarly
inquiry. This Article does not seek to contribute to that litera-
ture, but rather employs extant accounts of legitimacy to demon-
strate the relationship between gravity and the ICC's actual and
perceived legitimacy. The Article argues that gravity acts to legit-
imize the Court in two interrelated ways: the gravity threshold
helps to ensure the moral legitimacy of the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction, and the Prosecutor's discretionary use of relative
gravity strongly affects perceptions of the Court's legitimacy.
Because the Court's moral legitimacy is largely secured by
other factors, including the seriousness limits on the Court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, the gravity threshold plays a relatively
minor part in ensuring the Court's normative legitimacy. In
contrast, the Court's sociological legitimacy-perceptions that
the Court is acting appropriately-will likely be strongly affected
by the Prosecutor's selection decisions. The relationship be-
tween gravity as a selection criterion and perceptions of the
Court's legitimacy is complicated by the conflicting views rele-
vant audiences often hold. For example, a decision to prosecute
only the leaders responsible for the most heinous crimes may
increase the Court's legitimacy in some audiences, while others
may require prosecutions of all sides of the conflict to consider
the Court legitimate.
These observations about gravity's role in legitimizing the
ICC lead to some important conclusions in Part IV about how
the Court should operationalize gravity in its work. With regard
to gravity threshold determinations, a relatively straightforward
factor-based analysis is suggested. The Article sets forth the rele-
vant factors and argues that only cases scoring at the bottom of
the gravity spectrum on all factors should be excluded based on
the gravity threshold. In practice, this will mean rejecting small-
scale, isolated war crimes committed by followers without an ele-
vated intent. A higher threshold would conflict with the Court's
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jurisdictional regime and undermine its ability to accomplish a
range of potentially important goals.
The Prosecutor's approach to gravity as a selection criterion
is both more important and more complex than the gravity
threshold determination. When the Prosecutor selects among
admissible situations and cases he necessarily prioritizes compet-
ing ICC goals, asserting a particular vision of the Court's role in
the international legal and moral order. The international crim-
inal law system remains in its infancy and no consensus has
emerged regarding the appropriate goals for the ICC or priori-
ties among them. In the absence of such consensus, the Prose-
cutor is required to reach a subjective conclusion about whether
it is more important, for example, to prosecute a case involving
many direct victims or one resulting in widespread environmen-
tal harm. There are no objectively correct answers to such ques-
tions and different audiences are likely to reach significantly dif-
ferent conclusions. Perhaps as the system matures, greater con-
sensus will be reached regarding the appropriate goals of
international criminal tribunals. Until then, the Prosecutor's
best hope of enhancing the ICC's legitimacy lies in the careful
consideration of different perspectives and widespread dissemi-
nation of the bases for his selection decisions.
II. GRAVITY'S ROLES IN THE ICC REGIME
Gravity plays two important and distinct roles in the ICC re-
gime. 7 First, the concept of gravity provides a legal and norma-
tive basis for the Court's jurisdiction as well as the exercise of
that jurisdiction; and second, consideration of relative gravity is
an important factor in the Prosecutor's discretionary selection of
situations and cases to pursue. The first function is embedded
in the Rome Statute's provisions regarding jurisdiction and its
exercise, including admissibility.' 8 Nothing in Statute addresses,
17. In addition to the roles discussed herein, gravity has other functions in the
Rome Statute, including in such areas as arrest proceedings, penalties, and sentences.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 59, 77, 78.
18. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 1, 5(1), 15(2), 17(1)(d), 53(1)-(2). The
Rome Statute's gravity threshold is included under the heading "admissibility," while a
different article headed "exercise ofjurisdiction" sets forth the ways in which the Inter-
national Criminal Court's ("ICC"'s or "Court"'s) exercise of jurisdiction can be "trig-
gered," including initiation of a case by the Prosecutor or referral by a State Party or the
Security Council. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 13, 17. However, as the Interna-
tional Law Commission ("ILC") noted in drafting the gravity provision, the determina-
2009] 1405
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however, whether or when the Prosecutor should consider rela-
tive gravity in making selection decisions. In fact, the Statute is
ambiguous about the extent of the Prosecutor's discretion to re-
ject potential situations and cases.
This Part examines the relevant statutory provisions to eluci-
date gravity's place in the Court's jurisdictional regime, identify
when the Prosecutor and Court are required to consider the
gravity threshold, and suggest when the Prosecutor has discre-
tion to consider relative gravity. Next, the discussions of gravity
in the Statute's drafting history are explored for indications of
the intent behind these provisions. Finally, the approaches to
gravity adopted thus far by the Court's judges and Prosecutor are
described and critiqued.
A. Relevant Provisions of the Rome Statute
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The concept of gravity is central to the ICC's subject matter
jurisdiction. Article 1 of the Statute grants the ICC "power to
exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern, as referred to in this Statute," 9 and Arti-
cle 5 limits the Court's jurisdiction to "the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole."20 Article 5
goes on to list the four categories of crimes within the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and aggression. The Statute defines these crimes
(with the exception of aggression),2 1 and their elements are fur-
ther elaborated in the Elements of Crimes, an additional source
of law for the Court.22
The Statute thus implies that genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and aggression are "the most serious crimes
fion of gravity is part of the Court's decision whether to exercise jurisdiction. Int'l Law
Comm'n [ILCI, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth
Session, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 1 91, art. 35 cmt., U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994),
reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/
Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Report oftheILC's 46th Sess.]. This Article therefore refers to
admissibility considerations as part of the process of deciding whether to exercise the
Court's jurisdiction.
19. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. I (emphasis added).
20. Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
21. The Court may not exercise jurisdiction over aggression until it is defined. See
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
22. Id. art. 21.
GRAVITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE ICC
of concern to the international community. '23 The question of
what gives rise to the international community's "concern" over
particular crimes is complex and beyond the scope of this discus-
sion.24 Regardless of any additional grounds that might be iden-
tified, however, some element of gravity is clearly required for a
crime to concern the international community.25 International
crimes will not always be more serious than domestic crimes. In
fact, some international crimes, such as incitement to genocide,
may not even be criminalized in all domestic systems. Nonethe-
less, at least under the Rome Statute, international jurisdiction is
not permitted unless the crime bears some indicia of gravity.
For genocide and crimes against humanity, the contextual
aspects of the definitions seek to distinguish these crimes from
"ordinary" crimes at least in part through elements suggesting
gravity. Thus, for genocide the Statute requires intent to destroy
a listed group in whole or in part,26 and the Elements of Crimes
mandate that the conduct occurred "in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was
conduct that could itself effect such destruction. "27 Likewise,
crimes against humanity are defined as one or more enumerated
inhumane acts "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack" against a civilian population.2  The requisite "attack" is
"a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [enu-
merated] acts . . . pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack. .. -29 Additionally,
some of the enumerated acts contain references to gravity. For
example, forms of sexual violence other than those listed must
be of "comparable gravity" to the listed acts and "other inhu-
mane acts" must be "of a similar character. '30 Thus, the ele-
ments of genocide and crimes against humanity seek to ensure
that only serious conduct is captured through such requirements
as group targeting, scale, and systematicity.
23. Id. pmbl.
24. See supra note 2.
25. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 1, 5.
26. Id. art. 6.
27. See Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Court
[ICC-ASP], Elements of Crimes, art. 6, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-B) (Sept. 9, 2002) [herein-
after Elements of Crimes].
28. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 7(l)(g), (k).
14072009]
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The definition of war crimes, on the other hand, does not
contain required elements ensuring their gravity. This was a
source of significant debate at the Rome Conference, at which
some participants preferred to limit the Court's jurisdiction over
war crimes to those "committed as part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.""1 Proponents
of the restriction argued that only systematic and large-scale
crimes are sufficiently serious to concern the international com-
munity, while opponents countered that the Court's deterrent
capacity would be undermined by such a jurisdictional limita-
tion. 2 The compromise adopted grants the Court jurisdiction
over war crimes "in particular" when they meet the threshold.33
The Court is thus discouraged from exercising jurisdiction over
small-scale, isolated war crimes but retains the ability to do so.
The inclusion within the Court's jurisdiction of small-scale,
isolated war crimes that are arguably not "the most serious
crimes of international concern '34 suggests a contradiction
within the Statute. As discussed below, one way to resolve that
contradiction is to treat the gravity threshold provision as apply-
ing primarily to war crimes falling below the definition's op-
tional threshold. In other words, the gravity threshold ensures
that cases involving war crimes that are not large-scale or system-
atic are excluded unless they present some other indicia of grav-
ity.
2. Decision to Exercise Jurisdiction
In addition to the jurisdictional provisions addressing the
gravity of crimes, the judges and Prosecutor are required to con-
sider the gravity of actual or potential cases in deciding whether
to act in particular situations and cases. These decisions take
31. See Herman von Hebel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 11, at 79, 107-08.
32. See id.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8.
34. Id. art. 1.
35. The concepts of "situation" and "case" are not defined in the Statute and are
subject to various interpretations. See, e.g., Int'l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecu-
tor [ICC-OTP], Informal Expert Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice
9 n.10, ICC-01/04-01/07-1015 (Jan. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc656350.pdf. The current Prosecutor defines a "case" as comprising
one or more alleged suspects and one or more alleged crimes within the Court'sjuris-
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place in several stages. First, the Prosecutor conducts a prelimi-
nary examination of information he receives or requests from
any reliable source;3 6 second, the Prosecutor opens a formal in-
vestigation into a situation, a process that sometimes requires ju-
dicial authorization; 7 third, the Prosecutor selects particular
cases within the situation for prosecution or declines to prose-
cute any case; 38 and finally, a relevant state or party to a case may
challenge admissibility or the Court may raise admissibility on its
own motion.3 9 Throughout this process, the Prosecutor and
sometimes the judges must consider whether potential or actual
cases meet the gravity threshold for admissibility.4" Additionally,
although the Statute is not always clear on the matter, there are
several points in the process when the Prosecutor appears to
have discretion to consider relative gravity in selecting among po-
tential situations and cases.
a. Preliminary Examination of a Situation
The process of deciding whether to exercise the Court's ju-
risdiction begins when that jurisdiction is triggered. Such trig-
gering can derive from the Prosecutor acting proprio motu, or
from a referral by the Security Council or a State Party to the
Statute.4 ' In either case, the Prosecutor conducts a preliminary
examination of the information he has received from any relia-
ble source, and may request additional information and receive
written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.4 2 In this pre-
liminary phase, the Prosecutor must "analyse the seriousness of
diction, while "situation" is a broader concept referring to a territorial and temporal
context in which such crimes have allegedly been committed. See ICC-OTP, Draft for
Discussion: Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 1 Uune 2006) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Draft: Criteria for Selection].
36. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 15(2), 53(1); ICC-ASP, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, R.104, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part.II-A) (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure and Evidence].
37. Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 15(3)-(4), 53(1); Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, supra note 36, R. 48 (making factors set forth in Article 53(1) applicable to
investigations initiated proprio motu).
38. The Statute contains no provision regarding how to select among admissible
cases, but does include a provision regarding the decision not to prosecute any case.
Rome Statute supra note 2, art. 53(2).
39. Id. art. 19.
40. Id. arts. 15, 53, 19.
41. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13.
42. Id. art. 15; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 36, R. 104.
140920091
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the information received. 43
When a situation is referred to the Prosecutor, he must de-
termine if there is a reasonable basis to investigate any case and,
if so, he must initiate an investigation.44 As such, the Prosecutor
does not appear to have discretion to reject a referred situation
at this preliminary stage based on a relative gravity determina-
tion. As discussed below, the only way to read the Statute as
granting the Prosecutor such discretion for referred situations is
to locate that discretion within the "reasonable basis" analysis re-
quired for initiating investigations.
With regard to investigations initiated proprio motu, on the
other hand, the Statute contains contradictory provisions con-
cerning the extent of the Prosecutor's discretion. On the one
hand, Article 15, which governs such investigations, begins with
the statement that the Prosecutor "may" initiate investigations
proprio motu, indicating the decision is entirely discretionary.45
On the other hand, the same article states that the Prosecutor
"shall" analyze the seriousness of the information received and
"shall" request authorization for an investigation from the Pre-
Trial Chamber if he concludes there is a reasonable basis to do
SO. 46 To further complicate matters, Article 53, entitled "Initia-
tion of an investigation," makes no distinction between referred
and proprio motu investigations, and states that the Prosecutor
"shall" initiate an investigation after evaluating the information
made available to him unless he determines there is no reasona-
ble basis to proceed.47
Some commentators interpret Article 53 to govern all inves-
tigations, including those initiated by the Prosecutor, and would
thus require the Prosecutor to request authorization for an in-
43. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra
note 36, R. 104.
44. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(1). Although referrals must be for situa-
tions rather than cases, Article 53 requires the Prosecutor to consider the admissibility
of "the case" in determining whether a reasonable basis exists. Since no case has yet
been identified at this stage, Article 53 appears to require the Prosecutor to forecast the
likely nature of cases in situations under consideration. See id.
45. Id. art. 15(1).
46. Id. arts. 15(2)-(3).
47. Due to complexities in the drafting process, the relationship between Article
15 and Article 53 was not considered in detail until after the Statute was finalized. See
HECTOR OLASOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
70-71 (2005).
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vestigation proprio motu whenever there is a reasonable basis to
do so." If this interpretation were correct, any individual or or-
ganization in the world could effectively trigger the Court's juris-
diction by providing the Prosecutor with information demon-
strating a reasonable basis for an investigation. This would
greatly increase the power of non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") and significantly limit the Prosecutor's discretion.
Another way to reconcile these competing provisions is to
consider Article 15 lex specialis with regard to the initiation of
investigations proprio motu.4' This interpretation finds support in
Rule of Procedure 48, which requires the Prosecutor to consider
the factors set forth in Article 53(1) in determining whether
there is a reasonable basis to proceed proprio motu.5' By applying
the factors only, the rule suggests that the rest of Article 53(1)-
including the compulsion to determine reasonable basis-does
not apply to proprio motu investigations.
Instead, Article 15 can be read to create an intermediate
step between the receipt of information and the reasonable basis
determination. In other words, upon receiving information, the
Prosecutor can evaluate its seriousness and decide not to reach a
decision regarding the existence of a reasonable basis when the
potential cases presented are relatively less serious than other
actual or potential cases available to the Court. This interpreta-
tion is not clear from the language of Article 15, which states
both that the Prosecutor "may initiate" investigations proprio
motu and that he "shall submit... a request for authorization" if
he concludes a reasonable basis exists. 51 However, interpreting
the Statute in this way avoids the absurd result that any individ-
ual or organization can essentially force the Prosecutor to pur-
sue a situation where a reasonable basis exists to investigate at
least one case.
48. See, e.g., Morten Bergsmo & Pieter Kruger, Article 53: Initiation of an Investiga-
tion, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE, supra note 11, at 1065, 1067; Giuliano Turone,
Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 1137, supra note 11, at 1147-51.
49. See OILASOLO, supra note 47, at 72.
50. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 36, R. 48.
51. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15(1), (3).
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b. Initiating Investigation of a Situation
Questions of gravity arise again at the second stage of the
process: the reasonable basis determination. Regardless of the
triggering mechanism, the Prosecutor cannot initiate an investi-
gation unless he determines there is a reasonable basis to pro-
ceed based on three factors: (1) there is a reasonable basis to
believe a crime within the Court's jurisdiction was or is being
committed; (2) the case is or would be admissible; and (3)
"[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests
of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice. '5 2
The first factor mandates consideration of gravity through
the definitional requirements of the crimes, particularly for ge-
nocide and crimes against humanity, as discussed above.53 The
second factor requires the Prosecutor (and sometimes the
judges) to determine whether the potential cases in a situation
meet the gravity threshold for admissibility, that is, whether they
are "of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court."54
This threshold is mandatory-the Prosecutor may not initiate in-
vestigation of a situation where the likely cases are insufficiently
grave. Unlike the Prosecutor's discretionary consideration of
relative gravity in deciding whether to use his proprio motu pow-
ers, here gravity serves as a floor below which the Prosecutor's
activities may not reach. The Prosecutor has sometimes elided
this important distinction, as discussed below.
The final factor is whether, considering the gravity of the
crime and interests of victims, the investigation would nonethe-
less not serve the interests ofjustice. The concept of interests of
justice is not defined in the Statute, but was aimed at least in part
at providing the Court some leeway in situations where a rele-
vant state opts to employ non-prosecutorial responses to mass
violence such as truth commissions and perhaps even amnes-
ties.55 Some commentators have suggested that the reference to
gravity here provides the Prosecutor a second opportunity to de-
52. Id. art. 53(1); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 36, R. 48 (stating
that, in determining whether there is a reasonable basis to seek an investigation proprio
motu, the prosecutor shall consider the factors in Article 53(1)).
53. See supra Part II.A.I.
54. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d).
55. See, e.g., Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests ofJustice: Amnesties, Truth Commis-
sion and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 481 (2003).
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cline to investigate on the grounds that the situation is not seri-
ous enough even if it meets the gravity threshold for admissibil-
ity.56 In other words, the Prosecutor could cite the interests of
justice to reject any situation, regardless of the trigger, on the
grounds that he considers the situation relatively less serious
than other current or potential situations and would prefer to
allocate the Court's resources elsewhere.
Reading the Prosecutor's discretion to consider relative
gravity into the "interests of justice" provision strains the lan-
guage of the Statute, however. The Statute's use of the term
"nonetheless" indicates gravity should not be considered an ele-
ment of the interests of justice here, but rather a factor to be
balanced against those interests-whatever they may be.57 Al-
though the drafters intentionally left the concept of "interests of
justice" ambiguous, it seems doubtful many of them would have
accepted an interpretation that determined those interests solely
on the basis of the Prosecutor's discretionary relative gravity
judgments. Some states were quite intent on curtailing the Pros-
ecutor's discretion, so a provision allowing him to reject state
or Security Council referrals based purely on his own relative
gravity judgments would, at the very least, have been controver-
sial.
Furthermore, the Court was conceived as an institution
available to states and the Security Council. 59 Although there
might be some benefit in allowing the Prosecutor to reject politi-
cally motivated state referrals, it would certainly seem inappro-
priate for the Prosecutor to refuse to investigate a situation that
the Security Council has determined presents a threat to peace
56. See, e.g., Bergsmo & Kruger, supra note 48, at 1071; Turone, supra note 48, at
1153.
57. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 244 (3d ed. 2007).
58. See Silvia A. Ferndndez de Gurmendi, The Rome of the International Prosecutor, in
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, supra note
11, at 175, 181.
59. William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court, 6J. INT'L CIM.JusT. 731, 734 (2008) (quoting ILC, Working Group on
a Draft Statute for an Int'l Criminal Court, Report of the Working Group, at 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.491/Rev.2/Add.2 Uuly 18, 1994), reprinted in ILC, Report of the International
Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-sixth Session, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 91,
art. 25 cmt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2,
1, 45, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2)).
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and security simply based on his relative gravity judgments.60
Ultimately, the problem may be one of form rather than
substance. Even if the Statute is read to require the Prosecutor
to investigate all referred situations where a reasonable basis ex-
ists, he probably has discretion to decline to prosecute any cases
in such situations on the basis of relative gravity as discussed be-
low. Furthermore, nothing in the Statute precludes the Prosecu-
tor from allocating scant resources to investigations he feels do
not deserve the Court's attention. Additionally, the Statute has
other safeguards against inappropriate referrals, including the
complementarity regime 6 1 and the Security Council's ability to
defer investigations and prosecutions pursuant to its Chapter VII
authority.6
2
Finally, the Prosecutor's decisions not to investigate a re-
ferred situation either based on the gravity threshold or relative
gravity (assuming that is part of the "interests ofjustice" determi-
nation) are subject to judicial review at the request of the refer-
ring entity.6 3 Furthermore, if the decision is based solely on the
"interests of justice," the Pre-Trial Chamber may initiate review
on its own motion, in which case the Prosecutor's decision is
ineffective unless confirmed.64 If the Prosecutor's consideration
of relative gravity forms part of the interests of justice analysis,
therefore, the Pre-Trial Chamber would have the power to over-
ride the Prosecutor's decision not to investigate a situation he
finds insufficiently serious.
In sum, regardless of the triggering mechanism, the Prose-
cutor must decline to proceed in a situation where the potential
60. Cf Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, & Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE ICC 185 (Carten Stahn & Goran Sluiter eds., 2009) (arguing that basic
principles of international law preclude the Prosecutor from declining to investigate
situations referred by the Security Council).
61. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17 (declaring inadmissible cases that a state
with jurisdiction is already investigating or prosecuting in good faith).
62. Id. art. 16.
63. See id. art. 53(3). In contrast, the Prosecutor's decision to investigate a re-
ferred situation is not reviewable.
64. Id. art. 53(3)(b). In practice, the Pre-Trial Chamber's power to mandate an
investigation appears limited, however, since the Prosecutor controls his office's re-
sources. But see Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik
eds., forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1270369 (arguing that situational gravity decisions should be subject to judicial re-
view).
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cases fail to satisfy the gravity threshold for admissibility. In addi-
tion, the Prosecutor probably has discretion under the Statute to
consider the relative gravity of potential cases in deciding
whether to initiate investigations proprio motu, but it is much less
clear that such discretion is available to him when situations are
referred.
c. Case Selection
Considerations of the gravity threshold and relative gravity
also factor into case selection. The Prosecutor may only select
cases within a situation for prosecution that meet the gravity
threshold for admissibility.65 The Prosecutor has complete dis-
cretion, however, in selecting among admissible cases. In fact,
the Statute is silent as to how the Prosecutor should make these
important decisions. 66 The Statute's overall emphasis on gravity
strongly suggests, however, that one of the key criteria for case
selection should be the relative gravity of the case in comparison
to other cases the Court could prosecute.
The Prosecutor may also decide, after investigating, that
there is insufficient basis to prosecute any case in a situation. In
this context, the Prosecutor is again required to consider the
gravity threshold, as well as whether "[a] prosecution is not in
the interests ofjustice, taking into account all the circumstances,
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of the victims
and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or
her role in the alleged crime. '"67 Nothing in the Statute ad-
dresses whether the Prosecutor can decline to investigate any
case in a situation based on relative gravity. However, here the
language of the "interests ofjustice" provision, unlike the similar
provision discussed above, does seem to envision a relative grav-
ity analysis. Rather than pitting gravity against the interests of
justice, here gravity is one of the circumstances the Prosecutor
should consider in determining the interests of justice. Thus,
the Statute appears to grant the Prosecutor authority to deter-
mine that no case in a situation warrants prosecution based on
the relative gravity of cases the Court is prosecuting or consider-
65. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1) (d).
66. The Statute emphasizes the independence of the Prosecutor's office. See id. art.
42(1).
67. Id. art. 53(2).
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ing. As with investigations, a decision based solely on this
ground is subject to review and confirmation by the Pre-Trial
Chamber on its own initiative. 61
d. Admissibility
Finally, once a case is selected for prosecution, the accused,
the Prosecutor, or a relevant state can challenge the admissibility
of the case on the grounds of insufficient gravity.69 The Court is
also permitted, but not required, to raise the issue on its own
motion.7" Thus, the Court must dismiss an insufficiently grave
case if the question is properly raised, but has the discretion not
to consider the issue of gravity at all if admissibility is not chal-
lenged by the accused or a state.
B. Legislative History
As the foregoing discussion demonstrated, the concept of
gravity is enshrined in the Rome Statute's provisions regarding
jurisdiction and its exercise. The Statute provides little indica-
tion, however, of the purposes gravity is intended to serve in the
regime. The legislative history provides little additional insight.
The prospect that the Prosecutor would consider relative gravity
in selection decisions did not feature prominently in the discus-
sions, and the gravity threshold for admissibility provoked virtu-
ally no controversy. Nonetheless, the legislative history is in-
structive because it highlights the great importance the drafters
placed on the concept of gravity as a limit on the Court's subject
matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the very absence of significant
discussion of the gravity threshold serves to counter claims that it
should be interpreted as a high bar to the exercise of that juris-
diction.
1. Gravity as a Limit on Subject Matter Jurisdiction
When the International Law Commission ("ILC" or "Com-
mission") began discussions of a draft statute for an interna-
tional criminal court ("Draft Statute") in the aftermath of World
War II, the focus was on preventing war, rather than on the in-
68. Id. art. 53(3).
69. Id. art. 19(2).
70. Id. art. 19(1).
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herent gravity of crimes. 7' As such, the ILC's 1951 Draft Statute,
like the Nuremberg Charter, only prescribed "inhuman acts...
against any civilian population" (crimes against humanity) when
committed in connection with other crimes in the Statute-es-
sentially acts related to aggression and genocide.72 Similarly,
early discussions of a draft code of crimes against the peace and
security of mankind ("Draft Code") focused less on the gravity of
the crimes than on their "political element."
73
However, when consideration of the Draft Code resumed in
the 1980s after a Cold War-induced hiatus, the focus shifted to
the gravity of the crimes. 4 In fact, in 1983 the Commission
unanimously agreed that "seriousness," rather than the presence
of a political element, would be its criterion for selecting crimes
for inclusion in the Draft Code. 75 The ILC decided to exclude
71. Gravity was not entirely absent from the discussions, however. For example, in
concluding his report on the question of an international criminal jurisdiction Special
Rapporteur Ricardo Alfaro stated: "The community of States is entitled to prevent
crimes against the peace and security of mankind and crimes against the dictates of the
human conscience, including therein the hideous crime of genocide." ILC, Question of Interna-
tional Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (prepared by Ricardo J. Alfaro),
reprinted in ILC, Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session, 5
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12), 1 136, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1.
72. ILC, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1 59, art.
2(10), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.15, reprinted in ILC, Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of Its Third Session, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), 1 59, art. 2(10), U.N.
Doc. A/1858, reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 133, 136, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1951/Add.1.
73. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission Covering Its Second Session, 5 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 12), 1 149, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 1, 379-80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.l. The discussions sur-
rounding the draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind ("Draft
Code") form part of the Rome Statute's legislative history inasmuch as the purpose of
the Code was, in part, to elaborate the crimes that would ultimately be the subjects of
an international criminal jurisdiction.
74. See, e.g., ILC, Comments and Observations Received Pursuant to General Assembly Res-
olution 36/106, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/358 (1982), reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n pt. 1, 273, 276, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (Part 1) (reporting
German government statement that "[i]n view of the purpose and objective of the
code, it would seem appropriate the gravest international crimes which constitute a
serious threat and an immediate danger to the peace and security of mankind, be in-
cluded in it.").
75. See ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fifth
Session, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 11 47-48, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in
[1983] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 13-14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1
(Part 2) (noting that the Commission "unanimously agreed" that the Draft Code should
cover "the most serious of the most serious offenses").
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from the Code such transnational crimes as forging passports on
the grounds that the Code should be reserved for "offences dis-
tinguished by their especially horrible, cruel, savage and barba-
rous nature. 76 It also reversed an earlier decision not to limit
war crimes by gravity and included only "exceptionally serious"
war crimes in the 1991 Draft Code.77 Thus, beginning in the
early 1980s the concept of gravity took center stage in discus-
sions of international criminal law at the ILC.
Despite the acknowledged importance of gravity, however,
the ILC spent little time attempting to identify the contours of
the concept. Some members suggested the Commission should
develop precise criteria for identifying offenses against the peace
and security of mankind, including, for example, the inspiration
for the act, the identity of the victims, and the nature of the in-
terest infringed.7 ' The Commission ultimately found this sug-
gestion impracticable, however, concluding:
The seriousness of an act was judged sometimes according to
the motive, sometimes according to the end pursued, some-
times according to the particular nature of the offence (the
horror and reprobation it arouses), sometimes according to
the physical extent of the disaster caused. Furthermore,
these elements seemed difficult to separate and were often
combined in the same act.79
76. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-sixth Ses-
sion, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 1 63, U.N. Doc. A/39/10 (1984), reprinted in
[1984] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2,1, 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part
2).
77. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-third Session,
46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), ch. IV(D)(2), art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/46/10 (1991), re-
printed in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 104-07, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1991/Add.1 (Part 2); see also ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Forty-first Session, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 94-98, U.N. Doc. A/44/10
(1989), reprinted in [1989] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1989/Add.1 (Part 2).
78. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-sixth Session,
supra note 76, 34, reprinted in [1984] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 11-12, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 2).
79. Id., reprinted in [1984] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (Part 2); see also ILC, Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its Thirty-ninth Session, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 66, art. 1 cmt. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1987), reprinted in [1987] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 13, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987/Add.1 (Part 2) ("Seriousness can be deduced either from
the nature of the act in question (cruelty, monstrousness, barbarity, etc.) or from the
extent of its effects (massiveness, the victims being peoples, populations or ethnic
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Thereafter, the ILC continued to invoke gravity in its work on
the Draft Code, but without defining or elaborating the concept.
When the ILC resumed consideration of the Draft Statute at
the end of the Cold War,80 one of the first questions that arose
was which crimes from the Draft Code should be included in the
Court's jurisdiction. Although early work on the Draft Statute
had focused chiefly on crimes involving aggression, as one Com-
mission member pointed out, the "collective conscience" had
since evolved to recognize the need for "effective protection of
fundamental human rights."'" Some members took the view
that the "criterion of gravity" should be used to select the appro-
priate crimes from the Code for inclusion in the Statute.82 The
Court should only try the "principal perpetrators" of crimes "of
an extremely serious nature which had grave consequences for
the international community," leaving other crimes and perpe-
trators to domestic courts.83 According to this view, even some
war crimes would not be sufficiently serious for ICC jurisdic-
tion.84 Members preferring to limit the Court's jurisdiction to "a
very small category of crimes of extreme gravity," felt it would
make the Court more acceptable to states.85
Other participants, however, wanted the Statute to encom-
pass international crimes more generally, including crimes pro-
groups), or from the motive of the perpetrator (for example, genocide), or from sev-
eral of these elements.").
80. In 1989, at the request of Trinidad and Tobago, the General Assembly asked
the ILC to include within its consideration of the Draft Code a discussion of the poten-
tial for an international criminal court or other mechanism with jurisdiction over the
crimes in such a code. G.A. Res. 44/39, 1, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/39 (Dec. 4, 1989). This request set in motion a process that ultimately
led to the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998. For a detailed history, see M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: INTRO-
DUCTION, ANALYSIS, AND INTEGRATED TEXT, VOL. I, at 54-121 (2005).
81. ILC, Summary Record of the 2156th Meeting, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2156
(1990), reprinted in [1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990.
82. ILC, Summary Record of the 2155th Meeting, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2155
(1990), reprinted in [1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1990.
83. Id., reprinted in [1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1990.
84. Id. 1 9, reprinted in [1990] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1990.
85. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-third Session,
supra note 77, 1 119, reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 87, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
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scribed in treaties.86 A third group wanted to include all crimes
in the Draft Code, but exclude other international crimes as in-
sufficiently serious.8 " Members also had different views on
whether the Court's jurisdiction should be compulsory or op-
tional for States Parties,88 a question that had significant bearing
on gravity's role in the Court's jurisdiction. As one member
pointed out, if the Court's jurisdiction were compulsory, "the
crimes would have to be exceptionally serious, fundamental and
genuinely prejudicial to the dignity of mankind as a whole."8 9
Ultimately, the ILC adopted the broader approach to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, including in its 1994 Draft Statute not
only the "core crimes" of genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and aggression, but also "treaty crimes" such as hijacking
aircraft." This expansive approach to subject matter jurisdiction
was balanced, however, by a more conservative provision regard-
ing the acceptance of jurisdiction, which allowed States Parties
to "opt in" to the court's jurisdiction for all crimes except geno-
cide, over which jurisdiction was inherent in ICC membership. 9'
Furthermore, gravity remained central to the discussions of the
Court's jurisdiction.92 In fact, between 1993 and 1994, the treaty
crimes provision was amended to exclude from the Court's juris-
diction treaty crimes that did not "constitute exceptionally seri-
ous crimes of international concern. '93
86. Id. 1 120, reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 87, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2).
87. Id. 121 , reprinted in [1991] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 87, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/ 1991/Add. 1 (Part 2).
88. See ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-fourth
Session, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), 11 36-38, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992), reprinted
in [1992] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 10-11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1
(Part 2).
89. Id. 1 37, reprinted in [1992] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 10, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1992/Add.1 (Part 2) (1994).
90. See Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 91, art. 20(e), reprinted in
[1994] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part
2) (1997).
91. See id. 1 91, art. 22, reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 42-43,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
92. See, e.g., ILC, Summary Record of the 2346th Meeting, 1 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SR.2346 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 120, 123, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1994 [hereinafter Summary Record of ILC's 2346th Mtg.] (comment of Mr. Vil-
lagran Kramer: "It was essential to accentuate the concept of gravity as one of the main
parameters in defining the crimes.").
93. Compare Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 1 91, art. 20, reprinted in
[1994] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 38, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2),
GRAVITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE ICC
In Rome, the delegations rejected the ILC's broad ap-
proach to subject matter jurisdiction, opting instead to include
only the four "core crimes" within the Court's jurisdiction and to
make jurisdiction inherent over all of them.94 This decision
stemmed in part from concerns that "treaty crimes" might be
insufficiently serious, and thus "trivialize" the Court. 5 Limiting
the Court's subject matter to "hard-core crimes" would also
make it easier for states to accept the Court's jurisdiction.96 In
sum, the deliberations that led to the Rome Statute demonstrate
an early and consistent commitment to the concept of gravity as
a limit on the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
2. Gravity as an Admissibility Requirement
In the ILC's 1994 discussions of the Draft Statute, the idea
surfaced of using gravity not only in determining the Court's ju-
risdiction but also as a consideration in the exercise of that juris-
diction. James Crawford, the Australian member of the Commis-
sion and Chairman of its Working Group on a Draft Statute for
an ICC, suggested that the Working Group consider "whether
the international court should not have the power to stay a pros-
ecution on specified grounds" including "the existence of an ad-
equate national tribunal with jurisdiction over the offense or the
fact that the acts alleged were not of sufficient gravity to warrant
trial at the international level."9" According to Professor Craw-
ford, this would help avoid overburdening the court and ensure
that the Court supplemented, rather than replaced, national
with ILC, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.488 (1993), reprinted in ILC, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-fifth Session, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), annex, ch.
B, art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993), reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2,
100, 106-07, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.1 (Part 2).
94. At the insistence of a small minority of states, the Rome Conference's Final Act
recommends future consideration of the inclusion of crimes of terrorism and drug
crimes. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Final Act, 7-8, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998).
95. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an Int'l Criminal Court, Re-
port of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 50 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 22), 81, U.N. Doc A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Report of the
Ad Hoc Comm.]; see also von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 31, at 86.
96. See Report of the Ad Hoc Comm., supra note 95, 38.
97. ILC, Summary Record of the 2330th Meeting, 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2330
(1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 7, 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994.
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courts. 9 8
The idea of allowing the Court to exclude cases on the basis
of gravity may have been motivated at least in part by the Draft
Code's inclusion of "treaty crimes," which could be less serious
than the "core crimes" of genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and aggression. In supporting the suggestion, the
U.S. member of the Commission noted that it would help allevi-
ate concerns about the inclusion of such crimes as drug traffick-
ing and terrorism in the Draft Statute. 99 Mr. Eiriksson of Iceland
also commented that it would be desirable to give the Court
some discretion "in deciding whether or not to take up a case
even when that case clearly fell within its jurisdiction," so that
the Court would "deal solely with the most serious crimes, would
not encroach on the functions of national courts and would be
sufficiently realistic to adapt its case-load to the resources availa-
ble."100
As a result of these suggestions, the ILC included in its 1994
Draft Statute a provision entitled "issues of admissibility," which
represents the first draft of what would become Article 17 of the
Rome Statute.'0 1 That provision allowed the Court to find inad-
missible a case that had been or was being investigated by a state
with jurisdiction or a case that was "not of such gravity to justify
98. Id., reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 7, 9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1994 (1996).
99. ILC, Summary Record of the 2332nd Meeting, 1 59, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/SR.2332
(1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 20, 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1994 (1996).
100. ILC, Summary Record of the 2333rd Meeting, 1 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/SR.2333
(1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 30, 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1994; see also ILC, Summary Record of the 2358th Meeting, 1 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/
SR.2358 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 202, 210, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1994 ("It was indeed useful to state that only exceptional serious crimes of inter-
national concern were subject to the court's jurisdiction, and it must be remembered
that article 35 provided for the discretion of the court not to exercise jurisdiction.");
Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 50, reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2). Stating:
There were also suggestions that the court should have discretion to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction if the case was not of sufficient gravity or could be
adequately handled by a national court. This suggestion was explained in
terms of ensuring that the court would deal solely with the most serious
crimes, it would not encroach on the functions of national courts, and it
would adapt its caseload to the resources available.
Id.
101. See Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 91, art. 35, reprinted in [1994]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
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further action by the Court."1 2 In introducing the revised draft,
Professor Crawford stated that the provision was included to al-
low the Court discretion to decline jurisdiction, taking into ac-
count that the Court was intended for "the most serious crimes
of concern to the international community" and was to comple-
ment national courts. 10
3
The commentary to the 1994 Draft Statute notes that the
admissibility provision addresses the exercise of jurisdiction as
opposed to its existence and is intended to ensure the Court
"only deals with cases in circumstances outlined in the preamble,
that is to say where it is really desirable to do So. ' ' 1° 4 In deciding
the question of admissibility, the Court is directed to consider
the purposes of the Statute as set forth in the preamble,10 5 which
include prosecuting "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole," and complementing na-
tional systems.'O° The commentary notes that some members of
the Commission believed the admissibility provision was super-
fluous, because the relevant issues could be considered in the
context of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, particularly
the seriousness requirement for treaty crimes, as well as the pre-
conditions to the exercise of jurisdiction."0 7 Other members re-
sponded that "circumstances of particular cases could vary
widely and could anyway be substantially clarified after the court
assumed jurisdiction" so that the power to exclude cases based
on gravity and complementarity would enable the Court to hew
to its mandate.'08
After the "treaty crimes" provision was eliminated from the
Statute, broad support nonetheless remained for the gravity
102. See id. 91, art. 35(c), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
103. ILC, Summary Record of the 2356th Meeting, 60, U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/SR.2356
(1994), repinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 185, 191, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1994 (1996).
104. Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 91, art. 35, reprinted in [1994] 2
Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
105. Id., reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
106. Id. 91, pmbl., reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 27, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
107. Id. 1 91, art. 35 cmt. 3, reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
108. Id., reprinted in [1994] 2Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2).
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threshold. °9 Although some delegations preferred to move or
delete the provision, 10° their efforts gained little momentum.
Similarly, questions raised about whether the defendant should
be entitled to invoke insufficient gravity, were not taken up."'
When the Chilean delegation suggested at the Rome Confer-
ence that "there was a need to explain more clearly the vague
reference ... to sufficient gravity in regard to the justification to
the Court's further action"," 2 the plea fell on deaf ears. Thus,
the gravity threshold provision was subject to very little debate
among state delegations and appears in the Rome Statute virtu-
ally unchanged from the ILC's 1994 draft." 3
In sum, the legislative history reveals a fairly consistent com-
mitment to gravity as a core principle in determining the appro-
priate reach of the ICC's jurisdiction. The primary mechanism
by which gravity was ensured in the Statute was to limit the
Court's subject matter jurisdiction to the four "core crimes."
The gravity threshold for admissibility was added to the Statute
at a time when the Court's jurisdiction was envisioned to extend
beyond the core crimes, and retained with little discussion once
that vision narrowed. The legislative history therefore reveals lit-
tle about the appropriate content of the gravity threshold deter-
mination. Nonetheless, the very absence of any substantial dis-
cussion of this question suggests the drafters did not envision the
109. See JOHN T. HOLMES, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41, 47 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2002).
110. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, n.44, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998) ("Some delegations believed that this subpara-
graph should be included elsewhere in the Statute or deleted.").
111. See Report of the Ad Hoc Comm., supra note 95, 162.
112. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Committee of the Whole,
Summary Record of the llth Meeting, 1 29, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.11 (Nov. 20,
1998), reprinted in U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Official
Records: Volume II: Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Commit-
tee of the Whole at 211, 215, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II) (2002).
113. The language of the provision changed slightly from "such gravity" to "suffi-
cient gravity," and it became mandatory rather than discretionary for the Court to de-
clare inadmissible a case of insufficient gravity when a challenge is properly raised. Com-
pare Report of the ILC's 46th Sess., supra note 18, 91, art. 35(c), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, 1, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1 (Part 2), with
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d).
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threshold as a very substantial limit on the exercise of the
Court's jurisdiction. Rather, a reasonable inference can be
drawn that the drafters intended to exclude only the kind of de
minimis conduct the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") excludes based on the "seriousness" require-
ment in its statute, such as a combatant's theft of a loaf of bread
in an occupied village." 4
C. Judicial Interpretation
The ICC's judges have yet to examine any issue relating to
the Prosecutor's discretionary consideration of relative gravity
(for example, whether relative gravity can warrant rejecting a sit-
uation under the "interests of justice"), and have opined on the
gravity threshold for admissibility in only one case." 15 In early
2006 a three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber ("PTCI") issued a deci-
sion setting forth a test for the gravity threshold." 6 Five months
later, the Appeals Chamber overturned the decision without an-
nouncing an alternate test." 7 The issue arose in the context of
the Prosecutor's application for arrest warrants for Thomas
Lubanga and Bosco Ntaganda, both of whom are accused of
conscripting child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.' 18 PTCI held that a finding of admissibility, including
114. See Schabas, supra note 59, at 736 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-
1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 94
(Oct. 2, 1995)).
115. This may change in the near future. For example, a defendant recently filed
the first motion challenging admissibility. See generally Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-949, Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence
of Germain Katanga, pursuant to Article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute (Nov. 3, 2009).
116. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr, Decision
Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I's Decision of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation
of Documents into the Record of the Case Against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, annex I,
1 41-63 (Feb. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision] (Decision on
the Prosecutor's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58).
117. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-169, Judgment on the
Prosecutor's Appeal Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on
the Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58" (July 13, 2006) [herein-
after DRC Appeals Chamber Judgment]. Curiously, the appellate decision remained
sealed until September 2008 even though the Appeals Chamber had explicitly acknowl-
edged the importance of addressing the issue to the Court's future work. See id. 1 54
(stating that the interpretation of the gravity threshold for admissibility "could have an
impact on the Court as a whole" and that the Pre-Trial Chamber's erroneous interpreta-
tion "could lead to future cases being declared inadmissible on grounds that are incor-
rect").
118. See id. 1 5.
1426 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1400
sufficient gravity, is a precondition to the issuance of an arrest
warrant." 9 PTCI interpreted the gravity threshold for admissi-
bility to require that the conduct at issue was "systematic (pat-
tern of incidents) or large-scale."' 120 In this regard, PTCI stated
that "due consideration must be given to the social alarm such
conduct may have caused the international community."''
PTCI did not, however, explain what it meant by "social alarm."
Additionally, PTCI declared that the gravity threshold requires
the Court to prosecute only "the most senior leaders suspected
of being the most responsible for the crimes within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court . .. in any given situation."' 2 2 PTCI justified
the latter requirement by reference to the Court's deterrent mis-
sion, stating that prosecuting senior leaders will maximize deter-
rence because "other senior leaders in similar circumstances will
know that solely by doing what they can to prevent the systematic
or large-scale commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court can they be sure that they will not be prosecuted by the
Court."' 23 Applying these requirements to the cases against
Lubanga and Ntaganda, PTCI found that the former met the
gravity threshold,124 but the latter did not and was thus inadmis-
sible. 125
The Appeals Chamber disagreed with essentially every as-
pect of PTCI's decision regarding Ntaganda. In the operative
part of the judgment, the Appeals Chamber held that a finding
of admissibility is not a prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest
warrant under the Statute; nor was it an appropriate exercise of
discretion in this case since the suspect's rights were insuffi-
ciently protected. 126 The Appeals Chamber proceeded in dic-
tum 12 7 to reject every aspect of the lower court's test for the grav-
119. See Lubanga Arrest Warrant Decision, supra note 116, 1 18.
120. Id. 46.
121. Id.
122. Id. 50.
123. Id. 54.
124. See id. 75.
125. See DRC Appeals ChamberJudgment, supra note 117, 1 65 (describing sealed
section of PTCI decision).
126. See id. 1 41-53.
127. A recent decision of the Court notes that the Appeals Chamber statements
regarding the threshold test are obiter dicta. See Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad A
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of
Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmad A] Bashir, 1 48 n.51 (Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter
Bashir Arrest Warrant Decision].
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ity threshold. First, the Appeals Chamber stated that PTCI's re-
quirement of large-scale or systematic conduct for admissibility is
inconsistent with the definitions of the crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction, in particular, the definition of war crimes, for which
the drafters explicitly rejected such a requirement. 128 Next, the
Appeals Chamber rejected the "social alarm" criterion, agreeing
with the Prosecutor that it "depends upon subjective and contin-
gent reactions to crimes rather than upon their objective grav-
ity."' 129 Third, the Appeals Chamber disagreed that admissibility
is limited to cases against the most senior leaders most responsi-
ble for relevant crimes. It opined that, contrary to PTCI's con-
tention, such a restriction could detract from the Court's deter-
rent and preventive missions by creating a large category of per-
petrators per se excluded from the Court's reach.13 ° The
Chamber also commented that the Statute's provision regarding
the irrelevance of superior orders would be superfluous if admis-
sibility were limited to top leaders.1 ' Finally, the Appeals Cham-
ber noted that the Statute's drafters rejected a proposal to re-
strict admissibility to cases of "exceptional"' gravity.1 3 2
Although it resoundingly rejected the Pre-Trial Chamber's
conclusions and reasoning, the majority of the Appeals Chamber
did not pronounce its own interpretation of the gravity thresh-
old provision. One judge wrote separately, however, dissenting
on the appropriate remedy and articulating his own understand-
ing of gravity as an admissibility criterion.' 3 Judge Pikis echoed
much of the reasoning in the majority opinion with regard to
the gravity provision, but added that the plain meaning of the
words "not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
Court" indicate the provision aims to exclude only cases "unwor-
thy of consideration by the Court.""3 4 He elaborated:
Which cases are unworthy of consideration by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court? The answer is cases insignificant in
themselves; where the criminality on the part of the culprit is
128. See DRC Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 117, 11 69-71.
129. Id. 1 72.
130. See id. 11 73-75.
131. See id. 1 78.
132. See id. 1 81.
133. Prosecutor v. Lubango Dyilo, Case No. ICC,-01/04 (July 13, 2006) (Pikis, J.,
Separate and Partly Dissenting) [hereinafter Lubango Opinion of Judge Pikis].
134. Id. 91 38-39.
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wholly marginal; borderline cases. A crime is insignificant in
itself if, notwithstanding the fact that it satisfies the formali-
ties of the law, i.e., the insignia of the crime, bound up with
the mens rea and the actus reus, the acts constituting the
crime are wholly peripheral to the objects of the law in
criminalising the conduct. Both, the inception and the con-
sequences of the crime must be negligible. In those circum-
stances the Court need not concern itself with the crime nor
will it assume jurisdiction for the trial of such an offence,
when national courts fail to do so. Any other construction of
Article 17(1) (d) of the Statute would neutralize its avowed
objects and purposes and to a large extent empty it of con-
tent. The subject-matter must be minimal, so much so that it
can be ignored by the Court.
1 35
Thus, at least one judge appears to support the interpretation
suggested herein that the gravity threshold should exclude only
fairly de minimis conduct.
The Appeals Chamber was certainly correct to reject PTCI's
broad interpretation of the gravity provision. 136 That interpreta-
tion was inconsistent with the language of the provision, its con-
text in the Statute, and the intent of the drafters. Most impor-
tantly, PTCI's exceptionally high gravity threshold risked de-
tracting from the Court's ability to fulfill its most important
objectives. As the Appeals Chamber noted, the lower court's ap-
proach unduly restricted the ICC's deterrent potential because
lower-level perpetrators would have nothing to fear from the
Court, and national governments would lose an incentive to
prosecute. 137 Furthermore, the lower chamber's interpretation
would also have restricted the ICC's ability to pursue goals of
retribution, reconciliation, and truth-telling, which may some-
times require prosecuting those most directly responsible for the
crimes, in addition to their leaders. 138 Finally, the language and
135. Id. 40.
136. See generally Stephen Eliot Smith, Inventing the Laws of Gravity: The ICC's Initial
Lubanga Decision and its Regressive Consequences, 8 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 331 (2008) (criti-
quing PTCI's gravity decision on many of the same grounds cited in the Appeals Cham-
ber judgment).
137. See DRC Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 117, 77.
138. Cf Steve Heder, Reassessing the Role of Senior Leaders and Local Officials in Demo-
cratic Kampuchea Crimes: Cambodian Accountability in Comparative Perspective, in BRINGING
THE KHMER ROUGE TO JUSTICE: PROSECUTING MASS VIOLENCE BEFORE THE CAMBODIAN
COURTS 377 (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2005) (making a similar argument in
the Cambodian context).
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purpose of the gravity threshold provision support Judge Pikis'
view that it should exclude only cases involving conduct "wholly
peripheral to the objects of the law in criminalising the con-
duct."' 39
D. The Prosecutor's Approach
In his first two years in office, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-
Ocampo did not seem to pay significant attention to the issue of
gravity.14° This omission is perhaps unsurprising given the lack
of consideration the issue had garnered in diplomatic, aca-
demic, and practitioner circles. Thereafter, however, gravity
came to occupy an increasingly prominent place in the Prosecu-
tor's policy statements as well as his pronouncements regarding
particular cases. The Prosecutor now routinely emphasizes the
importance of gravity considerations in his office's selection of
situations to investigate and cases to prosecute. The Prosecu-
tor's pronouncements are often unclear, however, about
whether he is applying the Statute's gravity threshold for admissi-
bility or exercising his discretion to consider relative gravity in
making selection decisions. 4 ' As already discussed, these are
two quite distinct inquiries. The former is a theoretically static
line below which the Court should not exercise its jurisdiction,
whereas the latter is one of a number of criteria the Prosecutor
may consider in the exercise of his discretion. The Prosecutor
tends to conflate these disparate inquiries, sometimes citing the
"floor" of the gravity threshold to justify selecting situations and
cases over others based on his conclusion that those selected are
more serious. 14 2
139. Lubango Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 133, 1 40.
140. See William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity, in THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 229, 229-34 (Carsten Stahn & Grran
Sluiter eds., 2009).
141. See WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, AMERICAN UNIV. WASH. COLLEGE OF LAW,
THE GRAvrY THRESHOLD OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 52 (2008) ("[I]t has
not always been clear when the Prosecutor is talking about gravity as a requirement
under the Rome Statute versus gravity as one of presumably many factors leading to the
OTP's decision to prosecute certain crimes over other crimes.").
142. Scholars sometimes also conflate these inquiries. See, e.g., Schabas,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Gravity, supra note 140, at 241 (criticizing the Lubanga Pre-
trial Chamber for "assess[ing] gravity in a vacuum" rather than employing a relative
gravity analysis of the gravity threshold for admissibility).
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1. Gravity and the Decision to Investigate a Situation
As discussed above, the Statute is unclear about the degree
of discretion it grants the Prosecutor in selecting situations to
investigate. The Prosecutor implicitly acknowledged this ambi-
guity when he asked States Parties in mid-2005 to reflect on the
question: "Must the Prosecutor initiate an investigation in all sit-
uations that appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court?
Or, should the Prosecutor select amongst them the most grave
and urgent situations within the limits of his resources?" '143 In
his policy statements, the Prosecutor has not attempted to re-
solve this lack of clarity by proposing a viable statutory interpre-
tation or requesting a statutory amendment, but has instead left
the matter ambiguous. On the one hand, the Prosecutor has
claimed that the Statute grants him significant discretion:
[N] either referrals nor private communications automatically
'trigger' the powers of the Prosecutor. Under the Statute, the
Prosecutor is entrusted with a broad measure of discretion
with respect to what additional steps should be taken in rela-
tion to information received. Indeed, in the light of its lim-
ited resources, the Office of the Prosecutor is required to set
priorities, taking into account the limits and requirements set
out in the Statute, the general policy of the Office and all
other relevant circumstances, including the feasibility of con-
ducting an effective investigation in a particular territory.14 4
However, contrary to the interpretation suggested above, 145 the
Prosecutor also takes the position that in all cases-whether re-
ferred or proprio motu-he must determine whether there is a
"reasonable basis to proceed," using the criteria elaborated in
Article 53.146 Since the Statute mandates that once a reasonable
143. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement at Informal Meeting
of Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs 6 (Oct. 24, 2005) [hereinafter Moreno-
Ocampo Statement at Informal Meeting], available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/9D70039E-4BEC-4F32-9D4A-CEA8B6799E37/143836/LMO_20051024_
English.pdf.
144. ICC-OTP, Annex to the "Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecu-
tor": Referrals and Communications I [hereinafter Annex on Referrals & Communications],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/278614ED-A8CA-4835-B91D-DB7FA7
639E02/143706/policyannex-final_210404.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
145. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
146. See Annex on Referrals & Communications, supra note 144, at 2-3; see also Draft:
Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 7.
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basis is found, the Prosecutor "shall" pursue an investigation,147
it is unclear where the Prosecutor finds authority for his discre-
tion to "set priorities" with regard to potential situations. As ex-
plained above, one way to find such authority in the Statute for
proprio motu investigations is in the first paragraph of Article 15,
which states that the Prosecutor "may" initiate such investiga-
tions."' Although Article 15 also mandates that the Prosecutor
"shall" request authorization if he finds a reasonable basis, he
arguably need not reach that determination if he excludes the
situation based on a relative gravity analysis.
The Prosecutor has not taken this view, however, perhaps
because it applies only to proprio motu investigations and does not
allow him similar discretion in referred situations. Nor has the
Prosecutor sought to interpret the "interests of justice" provision
as allowing him to reject referred situations based on relative
gravity. In fact, the Prosecutor has issued a policy paper adopt-
ing a rather restrictive vision of the "interests of justice."'49 In-
stead, the Prosecutor has sought to locate his discretion to pri-
oritize situations by to their relative gravity in the Statute's gravity
threshold provision. According to the Prosecutor, the Statute's in-
clusion of gravity as an admissibility criterion "seems to reflect
the wish of [the] founders that the ICC should focus on the grav-
est situations in the world."' 5 ° In justifying his selection of situa-
tions, therefore, the Prosecutor tends to reference the gravity
threshold. For example, the Prosecutor stated:
With regard to the selection of situations, once the require-
ments of temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction are met,
the Office is guided by the standard of gravity. Although any
crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is a serious
matter, the Rome Statute... clearly foresees and requires an
additional consideration of "gravity" whereby the Office must
determine that a case is of sufficient gravity to justify further
147. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 15(3), 53(1).
148. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
149. See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-73422BB23528/1436
40/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf (declaring that the exercise of the Prosecutor's dis-
cretion under the interests of justice provision is "exceptional in its nature" and that
"there is a presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution" whenever the other
criteria in Article 53 are met).
150. Moreno-Ocampo Statement at Informal Meeting, supra note 143, at 8-9 (em-
phasis added).
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action by the Court .... After thorough analysis, the Office
concluded that the situations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo ("DRC") and Northern Uganda were the gravest
admissible situations under the jurisdiction of the Court.151
The Prosecutor thus tends to imply that his selection decisions
are justified or even required by the Statute's gravity threshold
for admissibility.
The Prosecutor explicitly conflated the gravity threshold for
admissibility with his relative gravity discretion in explaining his
refusal to pursue proprio motu the situation of British war crimes
in Iraq. Although he determined there was a reasonable basis to
believe British soldiers had committed war crimes, including
four to twelve willful killings, he declared that the situation did
not meet the gravity threshold for admissibility because the num-
ber of victims alleged "was of a different order" than that in
other situations before the Court, which involve thousands of
deaths. 5 2 Thus, the "threshold" was treated as a relative analysis
based primarily on the number of victims in each situation.
While the Prosecutor's conflation of the gravity threshold
and discretionary relative gravity affords him significant leeway
in deciding which situations to pursue, strong arguments miti-
gate against this approach. Most importantly, the text of the
Statute-"not of sufficient gravity to justify further action"-indi-
cates a threshold is required, rather than a comparison. 5 ' This
is confirmed by the legislative history, including, for example,
the statement of the provision's original drafter that the require-
ment would exclude crimes that do not "warrant trial at the in-
ternational level."'' 54
There are also important policy reasons to maintain the dis-
tinction between the gravity threshold and the exercise of the
151. ICC-OTP, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years
(June 2003-June 2006), at 6-7 (Sept. 12, 2006).
152. ICC-OTP, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Iraq (Feb. 9,
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP-letter-to-senders_
reIraq_9_February_2006.pdf. The Prosecutor also found that the situation did not
appear to meet the permissive threshold of Article 8(1), which grants the Courtjurisdic-
tion over war crimes "in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes." Id. at 8-9.
153. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(d).
154. ILC, Summary Record of the Meetings of the Forty-sixth Sess., 9 U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SR.2346 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 9, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1994.
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Prosecutor's relative gravity discretion. One of the Court's chief
objectives is to encourage states to fulfill their obligations to
prosecute grave international crimes. A declaration that a situa-
tion involves no sufficiently grave cases may well have the oppo-
site effect by removing an incentive for states to act. Further-
more, declining a situation based on inadmissibility sends a sig-
nal that all similar cases are outside the Court's purview, limiting
whatever deterrent reach the Court may have. In contrast, a re-
jection based on resource prioritization simply indicates the
Court's resources are currently insufficient to handle the situa-
tion, a circumstance that may change in the future. Finally, de-
fendants and certain states may challenge admissibility 5' but
have no standing to object to the Prosecutor's legitimate exer-
cise of his discretion. By basing his relative gravity decisions on
the gravity threshold, the Prosecutor therefore opens the door
to litigation surrounding the question of which situations are
graver.
The above critique does not imply that the Prosecutor's de-
cision not to pursue the Iraq situation was necessarily wrong; but
rather, that he should have framed the decision differently. If
the decision was in fact based on the gravity threshold for admis-
sibility, the Prosecutor should have explained why the potential
cases involved are insufficiently grave to be admissible before the
Court. For example, he might have decided the situation was
inadmissible because each of the alleged murders was isolated
(not connected through a plan or policy) and had no broader
impact beyond the immediate victims. In that case, he would
have to take the position that, as a general matter, isolated indi-
vidual murders in war are outside the purview of the Court. If,
on the other hand, his decision was based on a comparison of
the number of victims in the proposed Iraq situation and those
in other situations before the Court, he should have articulated
the decision in terms of his discretion to consider relative gravity
in initiating investigations praprio motu.
2. Gravity as a Criterion for Case Selection
In the context of case selection, the Prosecutor has acknowl-
edged the distinction between gravity as an admissibility crite-
rion and his discretionary consideration of relative gravity. For
155. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 19.
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example, in his draft policy paper on selection criteria, the Pros-
ecutor notes that not all admissible cases will be prosecuted and
asserts that, in selecting among admissible cases, his office "will
consider factors such as the policy of focusing on persons most
responsible for the most serious crimes ... 156 Nonetheless, in
other pronouncements, the Prosecutor has pointed to the grav-
ity threshold provision as the basis for his relative gravity discre-
tion to select cases. For example, in a 2006 report on
prosecutorial strategy, the Prosecutor stated that, "cases inside
[a] situation are selected according to their gravity."1 7 He ex-
plained this strategy by reference to the Statute's requirement
that cases must be "of sufficient gravity tojustify further action by
the Court," in other words, the gravity threshold. 5
The Prosecutor's failure to distinguish clearly between the
gravity threshold for admissibility and his discretionary use of
relative gravity has led to unfortunate misunderstandings. For
example, when the Prosecutor explained his decision to investi-
gate initially Ugandan rebels but not government forces in terms
of the relatively graver nature of the rebel offences, 15 9 several
generally well-informed human rights organizations understood
him to be declaring that the government offences were insuffi-
ciently grave to be admissible before the Court. 6 '
With regard to case selection, therefore, the Prosecutor has
156. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 11.
157. ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, at 5 (Sept. 14 2006), available at
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ProsecutorialStrategy-06Sep14.pdf [hereinafter
Report on Prosecutorial Strategy].
158. See id.
159. ICC-OTP, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the Uganda Arrest Warrants, at 2-3,
delivered at the Hague (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/
3255817D-FDO-4072-9F58-FDB869F9B7CF/143834/LMO_20051014_English 1.pdf.
Stating:
The criteria for selection of the first case was gravity. We analyzed the gravity
of all crimes in Northern Uganda committed by the LRA and Ugandan forces.
Crimes committed by the LRA were much more numerous and of much
higher gravity than alleged crimes committed by the UPDF. We therefore
started with an investigation of the LRA.
Id.
160. See HUM. RTS. CENTER, WHEN THE WAR ENDS: A POPULATION-BASED SURVEY ON
ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN UGANDA
18 (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesBy
RWDocUnidFilename/EMAE-79ZSZP-full-report.pdf/$File/full-report.pdf ("The ICC,
for its part, has stressed that the UPDF has committed fewer crimes than the LRA and
that such crimes do not meet the gravity threshold required to open an investigation.").
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appropriately adopted relative gravity as an important criterion
in his decision-making process.16 The Prosecutor should be
clearer, however, about when he is rejecting a case on the
grounds of insufficient gravity for admissibility and when he is
prioritizing cases based on relative gravity.
162
In conclusion, the language of the Statute and the legisla-
tive history demonstrate the importance of gravity as a limit on
the ICC's jurisdiction. These sources also suggest that the grav-
ity requirement is largely fulfilled by the definitional elements of
the Statute's crimes. The gravity threshold for admissibility, in
contrast, appears to play the more limited role of ensuring that
cases involving only insignificant instances of the relevant crimes
do not clog the Court's docket. Gravity's prominent place in the
Statute also suggests that the Prosecutor should consider relative
gravity in making some discretionary selection decisions, al-
though the provisions of the Statute are unclear as to when such
discretion is available. The lack of clarity surrounding these is-
sues in the ICC's constitutive documents highlights the impor-
tance of clear statements from the Court's judges and Prosecutor
regarding the appropriate roles for gravity in the ICC regime.
The Court must articulate a sound approach to the gravity
threshold determination and the Prosecutor must develop a rel-
ative gravity policy that recognizes the distinction between the
two inquiries. The following theoretical analysis and prescriptive
suggestions aim to assist in these endeavors.
III. GRAVITY'S ROLES IN LEGITIMIZING THE ICC
To develop appropriate gravity doctrines and policies, an
understanding of gravity's purposes in the ICC regime is re-
quired. As the forgoing discussion demonstrated, gravity is cen-
tral to the Court's normative framework. But why is gravity so
important? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, lies in the
Court's legitimacy. Gravity helps to legitimize one of the Court's
most important decisions-the decision to act-and thereby
serves to legitimize the Court itself. Of course, gravity is not the
161. See, e.g., Reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan, Statement of Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5321st mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5321 (Dec. 13,
2005) (stating that with regard to the situation in Sudan, the Prosecutor's office "identi-
fied particularly grave events, involving a large number of killings, mass rapes and other
forms of extremely serious gender violence, for full investigation.").
162. See WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 141, at 53.
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sole criterion on which the Court's legitimacy rests. On the con-
trary, a host of considerations impact upon the Court's actual
and perceived legitimacy from the professionalism of its staff to
the quality of its rulings and procedures, particularly those re-
lated to defendants' rights. 163 In fact, fairness of procedures and
punishments may provide the key to the institution's overall le-
gitimacy. 64 Nevertheless, the Court's decisions when to investi-
gate, prosecute, and adjudicate cases will strongly affect the insti-
tution's legitimacy because they proclaim a particular vision of
the Court's role in the international legal order. By helping to
legitimize those decisions, gravity contributes to the institutional
legitimacy of the ICC.
The term "legitimacy" is often used without definition to
connote a sense of generalized acceptability or success. 1 6 5 At the
same time, substantial scholarship has been devoted to elaborat-
ing the meaning and sources of legitimacy in domestic and inter-
national contexts. 6 6 This Article does not propose a general
theory of the ICC's legitimacy; but rather employs theories re-
flected in the existing literature to elucidate the links between
gravity and legitimacy for the ICC.
Legitimacy is used herein to denote 'justified authority."167
Three categories of legitimacy are distinguished according to
the primary character of the justification each employs. 6 '
163. Cf Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court:
A Liberal Defence, 4J. INrr'L CRIM. JusT. 765, 775 (2006) (arguing that the ICC's legiti-
macy hinges on its respect for individual rights).
164. See David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law 13-15 (Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No.
1154177, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l 154177.
165. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, The Tenth Anniversary
of the ICC and Challenges for the Future: Implementing the Law, Speech at the
London School of Economics 6 (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/
collections/LSEPublicLecturesAndEvents/pdf/20081007LuisMorenoOcampo.pdf
("The court's legitimacy is not dependant on having cases from all over the world, its
success will instead depend on the world supporting its cases whenever and wherever
the Court decides to proceed.").
166. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Coun-
cil, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 556 (1993) (citing legitimacy literature).
167. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Chal-
lenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601 (1999).
168. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and The Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REv.
1787, 1789 (2005). For a critique of Fallon's tripartite legitimacy framework, see David
A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1854, 1856 (2005) (arguing
that moral and legal illegitimacy are really no different than "morally wrong" and "le-
gally wrong").
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Claims of legal legitimacy suggest the correct application of laws
and legal principles;' 69 moral legitimacy refers to the moral justi-
fiability of ajudicial regime or decision;7 ° and sociological legiti-
macy considers the perceptions of relevant audiences that such
regime or decision is justified.' 7 1 Much of the legitimacy schol-
arship conflates these categories. 172 In particular, scholars tend
to blend moral and sociological legitimacy by incorporating jus-
tice into a framework oriented toward perceptions of legiti-
macy.1 73 The intermingling of these concepts can lead to confu-
sion because perceptions of legitimacy may have little to do with
actual, normative legitimacy.' 
74
At the same time, these distinctions are rarely clear-cut.
175
Perceptions of legitimacy often derive from normative factors,
1 7 6
and those perceptions in turn influence the development of the
norms. If a regime is in fact just, it may therefore be perceived
as such and the resulting conception of justice may then influ-
ence the development of the justice norm. Defining legitimacy
to exclude entirely an objective conception of justice, as Hurd
does, 7 7 thus seems to miss the mark. It is beyond the scope of
this analysis, however, to engage the substantial body of scholar-
ship addressing the content of the concept of legitimacy. In-
169. See Fallon, supra note 168, at 1794; see also Bodansky, supra note 167, at 605
(citing Oxford English Dictionary definition of legal legitimacy: "'the condition of be-
ing in accordance with law or principle."').
170. See Fallon, supra note 168, at 1796-97. Natural law scholars dispute that legal
and moral legitimacy can be separated in this way. See id. at 1801-02.
171. See id. at 1795-96; see also Bodansky, supra note 167, at 601 (distinguishing
sociological and normative dimensions of legitimacy).
172. See, e.g., G. C. A. Junne, International Organizations in a Period of Globalization:
New (problems oJ) Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 189,
191 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001) (citing as sources of legitimacy:
justice, correct procedure, representation, effectiveness, and charisma).
173. See Jose E. Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of
Legitimacy Among Nations by Thomas M. Franck, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 199, 207
(1991) (book review) (discussing Dencho Georgiev's critique of Franck on this point).
174. See IAN HUED, AyrER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 32 (2007) ("Although insiders may perceive an indissoluble connec-
tion between [justice and legitimacy], an outsider's assessment of the justness of a sys-
tem is irrelevant to the insider's perception of its legitimacy.").
175. See Fallon, supra note 168 at 1792-93; see also Bodansky, supra note 167, at 601.
176. See, e.g., Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 172, at 363 ("[T]he empirical
acceptance by citizens of formally valid rules as legitimate depends significantly on their
conformity with values and interests broadly shared among those citizens.").
177. See HURD, supra note 174, at 32.
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stead, it is sufficient for present purposes to highlight the distinc-
tion between sociological legitimacy-"what people think is le-
gally or morally legitimate"-and normative legitimacy-"what
really is legally or morally legitimate."' 78 This distinction helps
to explain the two primary roles gravity plays in the ICC regime.
As an admissibility threshold, gravity's chief role is to provide the
Court normative legitimacy, while the Prosecutor's discretionary
use of relative gravity is an important determinant of perceived
or sociological legitimacy. The Court's normative legitimacy is
an intrinsically important question and its sociological legitimacy
is a critical component of its effectiveness. 179
A. The Gravity Threshold and the ICC's Moral Legitimacy
The moral legitimacy of international rules and institutions
was traditionally considered to rest on state consent.8 0 Thus,
one author writes that the ICC "relies principally on state con-
sent to validate its political and moral legitimacy." '' However,
theorists have increasingly questioned this correlation between
consent and legitimacy because it depends on the often-flawed
assumption that the consenting governments represent the will
of the individuals they govern.1 82 As Allen Buchanan writes,
''state consent is of dubious moral significance in a system in
which many states often do not represent all or the majority of
their citizens or take their basic interests seriously." ' In fact,
state consent may not confer moral legitimacy even when gov-
178. See Fallon, supra note 168, at 1851; see also Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keo-
hane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS 405, 405
(2006).
179. See Bodansky, supra note 167, at 602-03; see also Buchanan & Keohane, supra
note 178, at 407 ("The perception of legitimacy matters because, in a democratic era,
multilateral institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic
publics.").
180. See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 234
(2004); Bodansky, supra note 167, at 604-05; Howse, supra note 176, at 359 ("The con-
sent of sovereigns provides a powerful basis for the legitimacy of the rules that consti-
tute the WTO treaties."). Cf Fallon, supra note 168, at 1797-98 (citing consent as a
basis for ideal theories of moral legitimacy).
181. STEVEN C. ROACH, POLITICIZING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
CONVERGENCE OF POLITICS, ETHICS, AND LAw 82 (2006).
182. See, e.g., BUCHANAN, supra note 180, at 234; Buchanan & Keohane, supra note
178, at 412-13; Fichtelberg, supra note 163, at 775 (stating that under a "republican
model of legitimacy" institutions are only legitimate if they represent the will of the
people).
183. BUCHANAN, supra note 180, at 234.
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ernments represent the majority because the will of the majority
can cause governments to perpetrate or abide widespread crimes
against minorities.18 4
Nonetheless, as Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane write,
"the on-going consent of rights-respecting democratic states" is a
necessary if not sufficient condition for the legitimacy of global
governance institutions such as the ICC.'8 5 In addition to such
consent, Buchanan and Keohane posit three substantive criteria
for the moral legitimacy of global governance institutions: the
institutions adhere to at least minimal standards of justice, they
provide a benefit not otherwise obtainable, and they exhibit in-
stitutional integrity by hewing to the goals that justify their exis-
tence.
1 86
For the ICC, the Rome Statute seeks to establish a frame-
work in which each of these three conditions is fulfilled. First,
the Statute's provisions, particularly those affecting the accused,
aim to ensure substantially more than minimal standards of jus-
tice.187 Second, the complementarity regime, whereby the Court
cannot act if a state with jurisdiction is already doing so in good
faith, ensures the Court provides a benefit that is otherwise un-
available. Finally, the gravity threshold for admissibility, along
with the Statute's jurisdictional provisions, aims to ensure the
Court's institutional integrity. The Statute's preamble leaves no
doubt that a key component of such integrity is the adjudication
of serious crimes. 88 If the Court were routinely to exercise juris-
diction over crimes that are generally considered minor, for ex-
ample, isolated instances of property theft in war, its integrity
and thus its normative legitimacy would be questioned.
Understanding the gravity threshold's role as helping to en-
sure the ICC's integrity helps us to determine the content of this
requirement. Since the normative requirement of gravity is al-
ready substantially ensured by the definitions of the crimes
within the Court's jurisdiction, the threshold should not be in-
terpreted as a substantial barrier to the exercise of thatjurisdic-
184. See Fichtelberg, supra note 163, at 776-77.
185. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 178, at 415.
186. Id. at 419-24.
187. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 31 ("Grounds for Excluding Crimi-
nal Responsibility), id. art. 55 ("Rights of Persons During an Investigation"), id. art. 66
("Presumption of Innocence"), id. art. 67 ("Rights of the Accused").
188. See id. pmbl. (mentioning gravity or seriousness in multiple paragraphs).
20091 1439
1440 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1400
tion. Thus, the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber's approach dis-
cussed above, presents a vision of gravity that is unnecessarily re-
strictive in terms of ensuring the Court's integrity. In fact, far
from assisting the Court in accomplishing the goals for which it
was established, such an interpretation would detract from the
Court's ability to prevent, deter and punish the range of serious
crimes prescribed by the Statute."8 9
Instead, the gravity threshold appears essentially to provide
a backstop ensuring that the Court rejects cases of crimes that
technically meet the definitions in the Statute, but are nonethe-
less minor. Since the threshold needs to exclude only minor
crimes to fulfill its purpose, it cannot be applied through a rela-
tive comparison as the Prosecutor has sometimes suggested. In-
stead, the absolute gravity of a case or potential cases within a
situation must be determined. The line cannot be drawn in the
abstract, but will evolve through the Court's jurisprudence. A
suggested methodology for making gravity threshold decisions is
proposed below. As former ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour has
noted, however, the real challenge will not be to weed out un-
worthy cases but "to choose from many meritorious complaints
the appropriate ones for international intervention. "190 As such,
the gravity threshold for admissibility is likely to be less critical to
the Court's work than the Prosecutor's use of relative gravity in
making selection decisions to which we now turn.
B. The Prosecutor's Discretionary Relative Gravity Decisions and the
Court's Sociological Legitimacy
While the Court's normative legitimacy is linked to the grav-
ity threshold, such legitimacy generally will not depend on the
Prosecutor's relative gravity decisions. As long as the Prosecutor
selects only cases above the threshold he is unlikely to jeopardize
the Court's moral legitimacy even if the cases and situations se-
lected are not always at the very top of the gravity spectrum.
That said, in the unlikely event the Prosecutor routinely selects
the least serious cases, ignoring more egregious cases without
189. See supra Part II.C.
190. Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 510, 520
(2003) (quoting Louise M. Arbour, Statement to the Preparatory Commission on the Establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court (Dec. 8, 1997), 1997 ICTY Y.B. 229, 232, U.N.
Sales No. E.99.III.P.2).
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good reason, he could call into question the Court's integrity
and thus its moral legitimacy. However, in the more likely event
the Prosecutor focuses primarily on cases well above the gravity
threshold, his relative gravity decisions will primarily impact
upon the ICC's sociological legitimacy.
Sociological legitimacy refers to the perception of relevant
audiences that an institution or decision is justified and deserves
support independent of any sanction or reward associated with
such support.' 9 ' Sociological legitimacy can attach to an institu-
tion in a diffuse sense or to particular exercises of the institu-
tion's authority, with each of these influencing the other.19 2
Where an institution enjoys broad diffuse legitimacy, relevant
audiences may be predisposed to consider its actions legitimate.
In turn, the perception of relevant audiences regarding the legit-
imacy of an institution's actions can affect the diffuse support it
enjoys.' 93
Scholars have advanced various theories for understanding
the sources of sociological legitimacy. For example, Max Weber
posited that such legitimacy arises from a belief in legality, the
sanctity of tradition, or a leader's charisma. 194 More recent
scholarship tends to focus on "favorable outcomes," fairness, or
procedural correctness as the primary source of perceived legiti-
macy.'95 The debate has also been framed in terms of "input
legitimacy," which focuses on procedural factors, and "output le-
gitimacy," which highlights substantive outcomes as the legiti-
mating force. 1 96
The ICC's sociological legitimacy is strongly affected by the
Prosecutor's discretionary decisions which situations and cases to
pursue.' 97 As a new institution, the ICC does not yet enjoy broad
191. Fallon, supra note 168, at 1795; see also MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 325 (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Par-
sons trans., 1947) (arguing that belief in legitimacy is normally one of the elements that
influences obedience).
192. See Fallon, supra note 168, at 1828.
193. The degree to which individual decisions influence institutional legitimacy
may depend on the depth of diffuse support the institution enjoys. For example, Fallon
notes that despite criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, the
decision had virtually no impact on the Court's diffuse support. Id. at 1829.
194. WEBER, supra note 191, at 328.
195. HURD, supra note 174, at 67-73 (discussing scholarship).
196. Id. at 66.
197. As already noted, such decisions are by no means the only factor affecting
perceptions of the Court's legitimacy. In particular, such perceptions are likely to be
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diffuse support. As such, content legitimacy-perceptions re-
garding the legitimacy of the Court's actions-will greatly affect
perceptions of the ICC's institutional legitimacy. When the Pros-
ecutor decides to pursue a particular situation or case, he asserts
a vision of the Court's role in the international legal and moral
order. These decisions, particularly the broader decisions re-
garding situations, will tend to shape perceptions of the Court's
legitimacy. Since sociological legitimacy is critical to the ICC's
effectiveness, it is important to understand how the Prosecutor's
relative gravity decisions are likely to affect perceptions in rele-
vant audiences. Such perceptions will not necessarily determine
selection policies, but should at least be taken into account as
discussed in Part IV below.
The current Prosecutor's approach to gravity as a selection
criterion suggests he believes-or at least hopes-that the legiti-
macy of his gravity-based selection decisions will be assessed ac-
.cording to a "procedural correctness" model. As discussed
above, the Prosecutor tends to link his discretionary use of rela-
tive gravity in selection decisions to the Statute's gravity thresh-
old. For example, the Prosecutor has stated: "In selecting its
cases, the Office is guided by the standard of gravity as mandated
by the Rome Statute." 9 ' In asserting that his selections are
"mandated" by the Statute, the Prosecutor seems to be signaling
that they should derive sociological legitimacy from this legal
genesis. In other words, the Prosecutor appears to believe that if
he is viewed to be following legally mandated procedures for se-
lecting situations and cases his decisions will be considered legiti-
mate.
The flaw in this approach is that there are no "correct pro-
cedures" for selecting among situations and cases above the grav-
ity threshold.'99 The Statute tells the Prosecutor very little about
how to accomplish this task. In fact, as already shown, the Stat-
ute is not even clear about the extent of the Prosecutor's discre-
affected by the Court's treatment of defendants. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 9, at 161-
62 (erratic sentencing practices can affect the legitimacy of international criminal tribu-
nals).
198. ICC-OTP, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years, supra note
151, at 2 (second emphasis added).
199. Cf HuRD, supra note 174, at 72 ("One difficulty with the procedural approach
is that it depends on a prior understanding of what constitutes an appropriate proce-
dure for the subject in question.").
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tion to select situations and cases based on relative gravity. 2°°
A solution that has been proposed to the Prosecutor's legiti-
macy dilemma is to promulgate prosecutorial guidelines con-
cerning such issues as the selection of cases and situations.20 1
This proposal assumes that the Prosecutor can enhance percep-
tions of legitimacy by adhering to good process, in particular im-
partiality, in his decision-making. 2 2 However, prosecutorial
guidelines cannot solve the legitimacy problem for questions
that are not susceptible to rule-based decision-making. 20 3 The
Prosecutor's discretionary selection decisions fall into this cate-
gory because, as discussed below, they require context-specific
prioritization of competing ICC goals. Since there is no consen-
sus in the international community regarding the appropriate
goals and priorities for the ICC, selection decisions are necessa-
rily subjective. Thus, at least until greater consensus is achieved,
no "correct process" can imbue these selection decisions with so-
ciological legitimacy.
20 4
Since the Prosecutor's selection decisions cannot be judged
according to their procedural correctness-at least for now, per-
ceptions of their legitimacy may hinge on whether the outcomes
are viewed as fair or favorable by a particular audience. Testing
this hypothesis would involve an immense empirical project. For
present purposes, however, it is sufficient to note the complexity
of identifying relevant audiences and to suggest some (admit-
tedly speculative) differences in the ways such audiences likely
perceive the Prosecutor's selection decisions. These observa-
tions will inform the subsequent discussion of how the Prosecu-
tor should operationalize his consideration of relative gravity in
making decisions.
Traditionally, states were considered the core legitimacy au-
dience for international organizations; an organization was con-
sidered legitimate if states were satisfied with its performance.205
Globalization has broadened the discourse, however, such that
200. See supra, Part II.A.2.a-c.
201. See generally Danner, supra note 190.
202. See id. at 536-37.
203. See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion
and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583, 654-55 (2007).
204. In contrast, the gravity threshold determination can be reduced to a factor-
based analysis as discussed below.
205. SeeJunne, supra note 172, at 192.
2009]
1444 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1400
few would contest that the ICC's legitimacy audiences extend
well beyond states. In fact, the Internet has drastically increased
the potential for any individual to become an important actor
with potential relevance for the legitimacy of an international
organization. These global changes make it increasingly difficult
to group individuals into "audiences" for which generalization is
meaningful. Nonetheless, for the purpose of illustrating the
complexities of the relationship between the ICC's legitimacy
and the Prosecutor's relative gravity selection decisions, three
potential "audiences" are proposed: global society, states, and af-
fected populations.
1. Global Society
For present purposes, "global society" comprises all groups
and individuals with an opinion about the legitimacy of the ICC,
from NGOs to multinational corporations, social movements,
and informed individuals.20 6 Assuming any meaningful general-
ization can be made about the views of this massive and diverse
category, it seems reasonable to suggest that such a consensus
would be based on commonalities in expectations for the organi-
zation. That is to say, "global society" will consider the ICC's ac-
tions legitimate when they conform to the common understand-
ing of the Court's purpose.
At the meta-level, there is a common story about the genesis
and purpose of the ICC. The ICC is widely viewed as a product
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a court es-
tablished to try the leaders of a genocide that killed six million
people. Many people also associate the establishment of the ICC
with the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR"), each of which was established to address
crimes involving hundreds of thousands of murders, rapes, tor-
tures, and other forms of horrendous mistreatment. Although
the mandates of those tribunals were not originally limited to
leaders, the cases that have garnered the most media attention
have been those of leaders like Milogevic and Karadfic.2 °7
206. See id. (discussing the meaning of "global society").
207. See, e.g., David Rohde & Marc Lacey, Arrest Helps Tribunals Prosecuting War
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A10 (citing former prosecutors, legal experts and
human rights groups as opining that the arrest of Bosnian Serb senior leader Radovan
Karadiic lends credibility notjust to the ICTY where he will be prosecuted, but to inter-
national criminal tribunals generally).
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As a result of this historical background to the ICC's crea-
tion, global society likely expects the ICC to try the leaders of the
conflicts in the world where the greatest numbers of victims have
died, been raped, or suffered similar levels of harm. Therefore,
selection decisions that are perceived as failing to focus on both
leadership and the numbers of victims of the most egregious
crimes could be viewed as producing unfair outcomes and di-
minish the Court's global sociological legitimacy.2"'
2. States
Setting aside states that consider the ICC institutionally ille-
gitimate, states will tend to consider selection decisions legiti-
mate when they produce outcomes that benefit, or at least do no
harm to, their perceived interests and those of their allies. Thus,
a state intent on making the Court operational may support a
decision to pursue a low-level perpetrator if higher-ups are out
of reach. On the other hand, a budget-conscious state may not
want to waste resources on a Court that is seen to be pursuing
perpetrators too low on the responsibility spectrum. Most im-
portantly, states will generally view selection decisions that target
their nationals or territory without their specific consent as ille-
gitimate. Thus, the Sudanese government has protested the le-
gitimacy of the Court's actions in that country,209 and Sudan's
allies have generally supported the government. 210 Additionally,
the British government and many of its allies would surely have
challenged the legitimacy of a decision to prosecute the British
soldiers accused of war crimes in Iraq.
The extent to which objecting states can influence broader
perceptions of the Court's legitimacy will depend in large part
on the whether the objecting government is itself considered le-
gitimate. When the Sudanese government protests against the
Court's legitimacy, for example, the impact of its challenge is
muted by the widely shared perception that the government is
208. Note that it is not the actual decisions that matter here so much as percep-
tions of those decisions, which are influenced by factors extrinsic to the prosecutor's
selection process such as media coverage, NGO advocacy, and government propaganda.
209. See, e.g., Derek Kilner, Protests Continue in Khartoum as Sudanese Government
Blasts ICC Decision, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/
english/archive/2009-03/2009-03-05-voal6.cfm.
210. See, e.g., id.; Michael Slackman & Robert F. Worth, Often Split, Arab Leaders
Unite for Sudan's Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, at A5.
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engaged in widespread atrocities against its own population. In
recent years, the U.S. perspective has also been widely dis-
counted in much of the world due to the U.S. government's bla-
tant disregard for international law, in particular human rights.
In fact, U.S. opposition to the Court may have actually enhanced
its legitimacy in the non-Western world. 1 ' In this sense, the le-
gitimacy perspectives of some states matter significantly more
than others.
3. Affected Populations
Many observers of international criminal law consider the
populations directly affected by the ICC's activities to be the
Court's most important legitimacy audiences. 212 Local sociologi-
cal legitimacy will likely correlate strongly to whether the Prose-
cutor's selection decisions are considered favorable and/or fair.
Within affected populations there will likely be widely divergent
views on such questions. For example, with regard to situation
selection, some African populations perceive the Court's current
focus on Africa as unfair, charging that it is reminiscent of
colonialism. 213  The Prosecutor's protestations that the African
situations are the gravest 214 have not stemmed this criticism.
Some local populations also object to the ICC's decision to act in
their particular situation on the grounds that they prefer other
kinds of responses, such as amnesties, truth commissions, and
211. See BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 166
(2008).
212. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Effective Public Outreach for the
International Criminal Court, HUM. RTS. FIRST, Jan. 2004, http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/international_justice/icc/outreach brief-paper011404.pdf ("Whether the ICC will
be seen as a legitimate and credible institution will largely depend on its ability to in-
form and engage about its work with the broader populations in the countries where it
takes up cases.").
213. See, e.g., NICHOLAS WADDELL & PHIL CLARK, Introduction, in COURTING CON-
FLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 8-9 (2008) ("[T]he Court's focus on Af-
rica has stirred African sensitivities about sovereignty and self-determination-not least
because of the continent's history of colonisation and a pattern of decisions made for
Africa by outsiders."); see also Joe Bavier, Congo Protesters Demand Release of Arrested Ex-VP,
REUTERS, May 27, 2008, reprinted in 3 WAR CRIMES PROSECUTION WATCH (June 9, 2008)
(citing one Congolese observer as stating, "It looks as though the ICC is just for Con-
golese. [U.S. President George W.] Bush has killed so many people in Iraq and nothing
happens ....").
214. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Report on the Activities Performed During the First Three Years,
supra note 151, at 2.
2009] GRAVITY AMD LEGITIMACY OF THE ICC 1447
local justice modalities.21 5 On the other hand, some local popu-
lations have indicated support for the Court's activities in their
country.216
With regard to case selection, local populations also exhibit
divergent views on gravity-related issues. For example, some lo-
cal audiences will consider it unfair for the Court to prosecute
only one side of a conflict even when that side committed sub-
stantially more serious violations. The ICTY's focus on prosecut-
ing ethnic Serbs caused many Serbs to oppose the tribunal,2 t7
while Bosnian Muslims unsurprisingly tended to be more sup-
portive.218 Similarly, in Rwanda there have been calls for the
ICTR to prosecute crimes committed by members of the govern-
ment forces2 19 even though those forces are widely credited with
halting the genocide. At the same time, many in Sierra Leone
were unhappy that the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted
members of the Civil Defense Forces, whom they consider he-
roes.
2 20
The question of which groups deserve prosecution has al-
ready given rise to some of the most serious charges of illegiti-
215. For example, a survey conducted in Uganda in 2005 and repeated in 2007,
showed that population preferences had shifted away from criminal trials toward
amnesties apparently based on widespread fear that trials might hinder the newly viable
peace process. See HuM. RTS. CENTER, WHEN THE WAR ENDS, supra note 160, at 4, 34-35.
Furthermore, transitional societies often place criminal trials quite low on their list of
priorities, with necessities such as peace, health, and food taking precedence. See id. at
22. Finally, there is an increasing focus in some populations affected by atrocities (as
well as external actors) on local justice and traditional methods of approaching post-
conflict reconciliation. See id. (showing increase from 2005 to 2007 in numbers of re-
spondents familiar with and supportive of traditional justice systems); see also DRUMBL,
supra note 9, at 145.
216. See, e.g., INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSNAT'L JUST., LIVING WITH FEAR, A POPULA-
TION-BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION
IN EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 47-48 (2008), available at http://
www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ASAZ-7HVBFR?OpenDocument (discussing
levels of support for ICC activities in eastern Congo).
217. See DIANE F. ORENTLICHER, OPEN Soc'vJUsT. INITIATIVE, SHRINKING THE SPACE
FOR DENIAL: THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN SERBIA 123 (2008) (discussing "Serbian per-
ceptions of anti-Serb bias").
218. See id. at 14.
219. See, e.g., Luc Reydams, The ICTR Ten Years On, 3J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 977, 985
(2005).
220. See, e.g., Clarence Roy-Macaulay, Sierra Leone War Criminals' Sentences Extended,
FoxNEWS.COM, May 28, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/printer friendlywires/2008
May28/0,4675,SierraLeoneWarCrimes,00.html (noting that original lenient sentences
reflected fact that "many Sierra Leoneans see the CDF as key to restoring order to a
war-ravaged country ... .").
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macy against the ICC. For example, in the Congo and Uganda
situations, the Prosecutor has thus far pursued members of the
rebel militias but not government actors who are also widely be-
lieved to have committed grave crimes. Although the Prosecutor
has sought to justify his decisions on the basis of gravity, charges
of illegitimacy have arisen regarding both situations. 22 1
Popular views are also complex on the vertical question of
what levels of responsibility should be targeted for prosecution
within each group. When local populations support prosecu-
tions at all they tend to favor targeting leaders.2 2 2 International
tribunals have thus been criticized for failing to pursue the most
responsible leaders.223 In fact, some populations prefer that only
leaders be held accountable for their crimes, 224 or that only lead-
ers be prosecuted while other mechanisms are employed for
thelower-level perpetrators. At the same time, many victims ex-
press a strong preference that their particular tormentor be pun-
ished.2 26
221. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT CASES IN AFRICA: STATUS AND POLICY ISSUES 25-26 (Sept. 12, 2008),
available at http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf; OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER FOR HUM. RTS., MAKING PEACE OUR OWN: VICTIMS' PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTA-
BILITY, RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA 69 (2007)
[hereinafter MAKING PEACE OUR OWN] ("[Miany focus groups underscored the failure
of the ICC to follow through on the arrests of the LRA senior leadership, as well their
perception that the ICC is one-sided for not having indicted any UPDF personnel.").
222. See, e.g., MAKING PEACE OUR OWN, supra note 221, at 69; AFGHAN INDEP. HUM.
RTS. COMMISSION, A Call For Justice: A National Consultation on Past Human Rights
Violations in Afghanistan 21 ("[A] majority of respondents were of the view that trials
could be restricted either to those who had committed serious violations and their com-
manders, or commanders only.").
223. See ORENTLICHER, supra note 217, at 15 (citing such criticisms regarding the
ICTY); HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD REPORT 277 (2005) (discussing "widespread cynicism
among the East Timorese public, who questions the fairness of a process that leads to
the prosecution of relatively low-ranking Timorese in Dili while the sponsors of the
violence remain free-and in many cases politically prominent-in Indonesia"); Smith,
supra note 136, at 338-39 (discussing perception that ICTY lacked fairness due to its
early focus on "small fry").
224. See HUM. RTS. CENTER, WHEN THE WAR ENDS, supra note 160, at 33; INT'L
CENTER TRANSITIONAL JUST. & HUM. RTS. CENTER, FORGOTTEN VOICES: A POPULATION-
BASED SURVEY ON ATTITUDES ABOUT PEACE ANDJUSTICE IN NORTHERN UGANDA 26 (2005).
225. MAKING PEACE OUR OWN, supra note 221, at 26, 54, 69.
226. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1820 (2005); Madeline Morris, Complementarity and Conflict: States,
Victims, and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 196, 200 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl
Kaysen eds., 2000).
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This preliminary discussion suggests some of the ways in
which the Prosecutor's use of relative gravity in selecting situa-
tions and cases may affect perceptions of legitimacy among rele-
vant audiences. With time, the Court may gain increased diffuse
institutional legitimacy, diminishing the impact upon its legiti-
macy of individual selection decisions. Furthermore, the Court
may eventually be in a position to adopt guidelines and policies
that reflect a consensus on the organization's primary goals. Un-
til then, however, the Prosecutor must think strategically about
how such decisions will affect the ICC's sociological legitimacy
among the various relevant audiences. As the following discus-
sion demonstrates, such considerations should not necessary dic-
tate the Prosecutor's selection decisions, but should at least be
taken into account.
IV. TOWARD AN OPERATIONAL GRAVITY THRESHOLD
AND POLICY
One of the ICC's most important challenges as it seeks to
interpret its Statute and establish its normative and sociological
legitimacy is to develop a sound approach to gravity, both as a
threshold requirement for admissibility and as a discretionary
relative consideration in the selection of situations and cases.
The foregoing discussion illuminated gravity's roles in the
framework of the Rome Statute and developed the theoretical
basis for gravity's centrality to the ICC regime, explaining the
links between gravity and the Court's legitimacy. This Part draws
on this legal and theoretical analysis to suggest a way forward for
the Court as it seeks to operationalize the concept of gravity in
its work. The suggested procedures establish a clear distinction
between the gravity threshold for admissibility and the discre-
tionary use of gravity in selecting situations and cases. The grav-
ity threshold analysis requires the Prosecutor and Court to bal-
ance the various factors affecting gravity, while the Prosecutor's
selection decisions necessitate prioritizing certain ICC objective
and sometimes audiences over others.
A. Factors Affecting Gravity
As a preliminary matter, it is important to identify the fac-
tors that affect the gravity of a case or potential cases within a
situation. In determining these factors for the purpose of the
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gravity threshold, the Court must look to its applicable law. Al-
though the Prosecutor is not restricted to such sources when he
considers gravity in the exercising his discretion, the relevant fac-
tors will generally be the same for both inquiries. The Court's
applicable law looks first to the Statute and the Rules and Ele-
ments of Crimes, next to applicable treaties and principles and
rules of international law, and, finally, to general principles of
law derived from national laws.227 The Statute's jurisdictional
provisions provide some indication of the content of the concept
of gravity, for example by limiting crimes against humanity to
those committed on a widespread or systematic basis. Addition-
ally, international and national laws, especially those related to
sentencing, suggest factors relevant to the gravity of cases before
the ICC.2 28 Finally, the ICTYs jurisprudence addressing gravity
in the context of whether cases should be transferred to domes-
tic courts is helpful.2 2 9
Most of the sources above distinguish between the gravity of
a crime and the responsibility of the perpetrator. 230 The Prosecu-
tor has followed this precedent in his policy statements regard-
ing the gravity threshold, elaborating criteria for determining
gravity as to crimes only. 231' The Prosecutor has separately stated
a policy of selecting the "persons most responsible for most seri-
ous crimes," but has not made this part of the gravity threshold
227. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21.
228. International sentencing decisions have been criticized for failing to reflect
adequately the perpetrator's level of moral responsibility. See DRUMBL, supra note 9, at
66. Nonetheless, such decisions are useful inasmuch as they identify the factors interna-
tional judges consider relevant to gravity. See id. at 64 (examining aggravating circum-
stances in jurisprudence of international tribunals); see also Andrea Carcano, Sentencing
and the Gravity of the Offence in International Criminal Law, 51 Ir'L & COMP. L.Q. 583,
588-90 (2002).
229. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 11 bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/
Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008).
230. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 698-705
(Aug. 2, 2001) (separating the gravity of the offense from other "aggravating factors"
such as the form of participation). The jurisprudence of international criminal courts
recognizes that there is significant overlap in these concepts, however. See id. at 702;
see also Robert D. Sloane, Sentencing for the "Crime of Crimes"': The Evolving "Common Law"
of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 5 J. I,,r'L CRIM. JusT. 713,
722-23 (2007) (noting need for clarification about whether "gravity of the offence" re-
fers to the culpability of the actor, the consequences of his conduct, or both).
231. See Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 4; see also Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy, supra note 157, at 5.
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inquiry.232 Article 17 of the Rome Statute, however, requires
that the gravity threshold be determined in reference to cases,
not crimes. As such, the Prosecutor and judges must consider
factors relevant to both the crimes and potential perpetrators in
making gravity threshold determinations. That said, when such
determinations relate to situations, the perpetrator-related fac-
tors will often be irrelevant since the likely perpetrators may not
yet be known. Nonetheless, in some circumstances, the Prosecu-
tor may already have substantial evidence regarding likely perpe-
trators and should consider perpetrator-related factors in deter-
mining the gravity threshold for situations. For example, the
Prosecutor could conceivably decline a situation on the grounds
that all of the persons most responsible have been killed. Fur-
thermore, when the Prosecutor considers relative gravity for the
purposes of the exercise of his discretionary, he generally should
take account of perpetrator-related factors when possible. As
such, while the factors proposed below include those that the
Prosecutor has adopted with regard to the gravity of crimes,2 3
they also encompass factors related to perpetrators.
1. Scale of the Crimes
In determining the scale of a crime, international jurispru-
dence looks primarily to the number of victims,2 3 4 but also con-
siders the geographic and temporal scope of the harm caused.23 5
Thus, a crime that harms few people for a significant duration
could be considered more serious than a crime that harms a
232. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 11; Report on Prosecutorial Strategy,
supra note 157, at 5. Interestingly, in an early policy document, the Prosecutor seemed
to take the opposite approach stating: "The concept of gravity should not be exclusively
attached to the act that constituted the crime but also to the degree of participation in
its commission." ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prose-
cutor 7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE
5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_PolicyPaper.pdf.
233. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 4; see also Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy, supra note 157, at 5.
234. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral
of Case Under Rule 11 Bis, 19 (July 22, 2005) (citing sixteen victims of torture and
rape in referring case to national courts); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T,
Judgment, 1 702 (Aug. 2, 2001) ("the number of victims and their suffering are relevant
factors"); Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 1 852 (Feb. 26, 2001)
(citing hundreds dead and thousands expelled as evidence of gravity).
235. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ljubicic, Case No. IT-00-41-PT, Decision to Refer the
Case to Bosnia & Herzegovena Pursuant to Rule 11 bis, 1 18 (Apr. 12, 2006) (citing
"limited . . .geographic scope and temporal frame" in referring the case).
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great many people only briefly. Harm that spans a large geo-
graphic area might also be deemed more significant than similar
harm with more limited spatial scope.
2. Nature of the Crimes
The question of which crimes are the most serious has been
addressed in relation to the application of the death penalty. 236
In that context, many national and international sources concur
that intentional murder is the most serious crime and probably
the only crime where the death penalty should be permitted if it
is permitted at all.237 Crimes of sexual violence are also gener-
ally placed at the top of the seriousness scale, with some jurisdic-
tions permitting the death penalty for such crimes as well. 2 " Fi-
nally, as a rule, crimes such as torture that involve physical and/
or psychological suffering are considered very serious.239 Crimes
against property, on the other hand, generally rank at the low
end of the gravity spectrum.2 4 °
236. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights restrict application of the death penalty to
"the most serious crimes." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6,
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; American Convention on Human Rights
art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. This has been interpreted
to mean "intentional crimes with lethal or other extremely grave consequences." Safe-
guards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C.
Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84 (1984).
For a discussion of the relevant law, see William A. Schabas, Most Serious Crimes and
the Imposition of the Death Penalty, Presentation at the Impact of International Con-
ventions Towards China's Death Penalty Reform (Beijing, Oct. 30, 2008) (on file with
Fordham International Law Journal).
237. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (holding the
death penalty unconstitutional for the crime of child rape and concluding that inten-
tional first-degree murder is more severe than other crimes "in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public") (citation omitted); Schabas, Most
Serious Crimes and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, supra note 236 (discussing
human rights law sources).
238. See, e.g., Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990, Rwandan
Organic Law No. 08/96, arts. 2, 14 (Aug. 30, 1996) (perpetrators of "sexual torture"
subject to death penalty).
239. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 703 (Aug. 2,
2001) (considering "the physical and psychological suffering inflicted upon witnesses to
the crime" in assessing the gravity of the crimes).
240. See, e.g., Schabas, Most Serious Crimes and the Imposition of the Death Pen-
alty, supra note 236, at 7 (citing U.N. Human Rights Committee comments suggesting
that property offences are not sufficiently serious for the death penalty).
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3. Manner of Commission of the Crimes
The ways in which crimes are committed can render them
particularly serious under national and international laws. In
particular, the Statute indicates that crimes committed in a sys-
tematic manner or pursuant to a plan or policy are considered
especially serious.2 4 ' This factor also includes whether crimes
are committed in a particularly heinous way,24 2 such as a deliber-
ately slow killing, and whether they target particularly vulnerable
victims, including, for example, women, children and the eld-
erly.243 The Prosecutor also includes in this category whether
the crimes involve discrimination or abuse of power.2 44 These
factors are more properly considered relevant to the role and
intent of the perpetrator as discussed below. Finally, Professor
Schabas has suggested that the commission of crimes in the con-
text of an aggressive war should be an aggravating factor for the
gravity analysis.245
4. Impact of the Crimes
The impact of the crimes is an important factor for the grav-
ity analysis.24 6 When a crime results in broad "social, economic,
and environmental damage '' 247 beyond the immediate victims,
the importance of adjudicating the crime increases, helping to
justify ICC jurisdiction in the absence of state action. Thus, for
example, the Prosecutor has noted that attacks on humanitarian
workers in Darfur threaten the delivery of humanitarian assis-
tance and impact the prospects for peace and stability in the re-
241. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(1), 8(1).
242. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1 703 (Aug. 2,
2001) (citing "'indiscriminate, disproportionate, terrifying' or 'heinous' means and
methods used to commit the crimes"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2A1.2
(2008) [hereinafter U.S. Sentencing Guidelines] ("If the defendant's conduct was ex-
ceptionally heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim, an upward departure [in
sentence] may be warranted").
243. See Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T at 702 (considering treatment of women,
children, elderly men, and young boys in determining gravity).
244. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 5.
245. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal
Court, supra note 59, at 10.
246. This factor is not found in sentencing jurisprudence because, in the absence
of intent, it does not affect the perpetrator's moral blameworthiness.
247. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 5.
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gion.2" As such, the Prosecutor notes that "[i] n some instances,
those crimes may fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. '24 9 In
fact, attacks on humanitarian workers in internal armed conflict
always fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.25 ° What the Prose-
cutor likely means is that under some circumstances they may be
grave enough to be admissible and/or prioritized over other
crimes even though their harm to the immediate victims may not
be very serious. Similarly, the assassination of a single important
political leader may have a broad impact on peace and security
in a region even though only one victim was directly harmed.
The Security Council invoked this rationale when it established
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for the primary purpose of
prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of Lebanon's
former prime minister. 251 This factor also encompasses crimes
that have a broad global impact, for example because they are
widely perpetrated and under-prosecuted. Gender crimes in war
and the recruitment and use of child soldiers are examples of
such crimes.
5. Role/Position of the Perpetrator
The role of the accused or suspected perpetrator will also
be relevant to the gravity analysis for cases and, in some circum-
stances, for situations as discussed above. This factor includes
both the leadership position of the accused, if any, and the role
of the accused in committing the crimes at issue, for example,
whether the accused planned, ordered or instigated the
252crimes. 2 National and international decisions factor both of
these considerations into assessments of gravity25 and the ICTY
considers them in determining whether it is appropriate to refer
248. Reports of the Secretary-General on Sudan, Statement of Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
supra note 161, at 2.
249. Id.
250. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2) (e) (iii).
251. See S.C. Res. 1644, 5-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005).
252. See Smith, supra note 136, at 347-50 (discussing "functional responsibility vs.
example setters").
253. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 242, §§ 3B1.1, 3B1.3 (includ-
ing leadership role in the offense and abuse of position of trust as aggravating factors);
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 708-09 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecu-
tor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment & Sentence, 469 (Dec. 6, 1999)
("[Tihe fact that a person in a high position abused his authority and committed
crimes is to be viewed as an aggravating factor.").
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a case to national courts.254 Some authors have also suggested
that gravity is increased when the perpetrator is acting on behalf
of the government.
255
6. Intent of the Perpetrator
Finally, the Statute indicates that the perpetrator's intent
can be an important factor in assessments of gravity. A crime
cannot constitute genocide unless the perpetrator has the spe-
cific intent to destroy a particular group in whole or in part.
256
There can be little doubt that murder committed with genocidal
intent is more serious than "regular" murder. Similarly, a crime
only rises to the level of moral condemnation associated with
crimes against humanity when the perpetrator knows that the
crime is part of a broader attack against a civilian population.257
Finally, for a war crime, the perpetrator must be aware of the
context of armed conflict.
25 8
Scholars and judges debate whether these differences in in-
tent result in a normative hierarchy of international crimes for
sentencing. 251 Whether or not a hierarchy exists, however, the
254. See Prosecutor v. Ademi & Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Decision for Referral
to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule llbis, 29 (Sept. 14,
2005).
255. See Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Crimi-
nal Court, supra note 59, at 10; Heller, supra note 64, at 14.
256. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6.
257. See id. art. 7(1); Elements of Crimes, supra note 26, art. 7.
258. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(1); Elements of Crimes, supra note 27,
art. 8.
259. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner, Constructing A Hierarchy of Crimes in Interna-
tional Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REv. 415, 420 (2001) (arguing "that the cha-
peaux of the crimes under international law should be read to form a hierarchy of
crimes, connoting increasing levels of harm caused by a defendants actions"); Prosecu-
tor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 1700 (Aug. 2, 2001) (noting that it can be
argued genocide is the most serious crime because of the elevated intent requirement,
but the individual circumstances of each case must be considered in determining pun-
ishment); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, Judgment in Sentenc-
ing Appeals, 69 (Jan. 26, 2000) ("After full consideration, the Appeals Chamber takes
the view that there is in law no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against
humanity and that of a war crime."); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-
Abis, 1 16 (Cassese, J., Separate Opinion) ("[W]henever an offence committed by an
accused is deemed to be a 'crime against humanity', it must be regarded as inherently
of greater gravity, all else being equal (ceteris paribus), than if it is instead characterised
as a 'war crime.'"); Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, 15
(Feb. 5, 1999) ("[T]he Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes the 'crime
of crimes', which must be taken into account when deciding the sentence."); Prosecu-
tor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, 14 (Sept. 4, 1998)
1456 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 32:1400
perpetrator's intent is certainly one of the factors the Court
should consider in deciding whether a case is sufficiently grave
for ICC adjudication. For example, while an isolated war crime
might be inadmissible, one committed with the intent to spark
genocide is likely to be sufficiently grave. National and interna-
tional sources confirm that the perpetrator's intent is relevant to
gravity assessments, particularly when the perpetrator acts with
premeditation2 6 ° or with a discriminatory motive.26 '
B. Gravity Threshold Determination
When the Prosecutor and judges apply the gravity threshold
for admissibility they should consider each of these factors to
determine whether the case or potential cases in a situation
merit international adjudication. Each inquiry will be context-
specific such that it is impossible to draw a line in the abstract.
The ILC abandoned an effort to detail the precise content of
gravity early in its deliberations,262 opting instead for the "vague"
reference to "sufficient gravity" that the Chilean delegation la-
mented at the Rome Conference. 263 Nonetheless, the preceding
analysis suggests some important guidelines for the Court as it
seeks to determine "sufficient gravity" with regard to cases and
situations.
("The Chamber has no doubt that despite the gravity of the violations of Article 3 com-
mon to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II thereto, they are
considered as lesser crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity. On the other
hand, it seems more difficult for the Chamber to rank genocide and crimes against
humanity in terms of their respective gravity."); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-
96-22, Appeals Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge
Vohrah, 20 (Oct. 7, 1997) ("[All things being equal, a punishable offence, if charged
and proven as a crime against humanity, is more serious and should ordinarily entail a
heavier penalty than if it were proceeded upon on the basis that it were a war crime.").
260. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 242, §§ 2Al.I, 2A1.2 (as-
signing higher "base offense level" for offenses involving premeditated killing com-
pared to other types of homicide); Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T at 711.
261. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 242, § 3Al.1 (increasing sen-
tence for "hate crime motivation"); Prosecutor v. Blalkic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judg-
ment, 785 (Mar. 3, 2000) ("The motive of the crime may also constitute an aggravat-
ing circumstance when it is particularly flagrant. Case-law has borne in mind the follow-
ing motives: ethnic and religious persecution, desire for revenge and sadism.")
(citations omitted).
262. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-sixth Session,
supra note 78, at 11-12.
263. See Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of
the Whole, supra note 112, at 215.
GRAVITY AMD LEGITIMACY OF THE ICC
First, as already discussed, the language of the provision and
its context in the Statute indicate that gravity should be treated
as a threshold and not a relative determination for admissibility
purposes. The provision does not, as the Prosecutor suggests,
require the Court to focus only on "the gravest situations in the
world," '2 64 nor does the Statute limit the exercise of the Court's
jurisdiction to the most serious cases within a given situation. The
gravity of other cases or situations unrelated to those in question
should have no bearing on the gravity threshold determination.
Second, the Court should proceed with great caution in rul-
ing particular cases to be below the gravity threshold. Each judi-
cial determination regarding the threshold will have a tendency
to influence future decisions in similar cases. Although the Stat-
ute does not require the Court to adhere to its precedents, the
judges are permitted to consider prior decisions as a source of
law.26 5 Furthermore, in order for its gravity threshold decisions
to be considered procedurally and substantively fair, the Court
will have to attempt a semblance of consistency. As such, gravity
threshold decisions will be quasi-jurisdictional in that they will
have a tendency to limit the Court's exercise of jurisdiction not
only in the case at hand but also for future cases and situations.
These decisions therefore have the potential to impact signifi-
cantly the Court's usefulness and should be reached carefully.
Third, although the judges and Prosecutor should apply the
above criteria as consistently as possible, the context-specific na-
ture of the enterprise means that no rigid formula should be
adopted. The Court must not, for example, set a particular
number on the victims harmed or mandate a certain leadership
rank for perpetrators. Rather, it should use the relevant factors,
considered in the particular context, to answer the ultimate
question: does this case truly involve the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community or, is the conduct at
issue "wholly peripheral to the objects of the law in criminalising
the conduct?
26 6
Fourth, because the crimes of genocide and crimes against
humanity require, by virtue of their definitions and the Elements
264. Moreno-Ocampo Statement at Informal Meeting, supra note 143, at 8-9.
265. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 21(2).
266. See DRC Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 117, 40 (PikisJ., Separate
and Partly Dissenting Opinion).
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of Crimes, significant levels of gravity, 267 the threshold should
generally not be used to exclude cases of those crimes. Rather,
the threshold should be applied mainly to cases involving exclu-
sively war crimes. Furthermore, cases of war crimes should gen-
erally be held admissible when they exhibit gravity indicators
similar to those required for the other two crimes; for instance,
when they involve the large-scale or systematic commission of
such crimes or are committed with intent to destroy or signifi-
cantly harm groups. The gravity threshold should therefore ex-
clude primarily war crimes that score low in each of the catego-
ries identified above: those committed in isolation from other
crimes, causing the least harm, and by the lowest level perpetra-
tors. Furthermore, situations should be rejected on the basis of
the gravity threshold only when they present no likely case that
passes the threshold.
Interpreting the gravity threshold to exclude primarily cases
and situations involving insignificant war crimes comports with
the Statute's legislative history as well as with the threshold's role
in ensuring the Court's moral legitimacy. Nothing in the draft-
ing history indicates the participants intended the threshold as a
very substantial limit on the Court's exercise of jurisdiction. On
the contrary, some delegations felt the threshold was completely
unnecessary as the requisite level of gravity was already en-
shrined in other provisions of the Statute.268 Had the drafters
placed the kind of importance on the gravity provision that PTCI
found in the Lubanga arrest warrant decision, there would
surely have been some discussion of the provision at the Rome
Conference. Instead, the moral requirement that the Court act
only in very serious cases is primarily ensured by the limitations
on the Court's jurisdiction. The gravity threshold serves to back-
stop these jurisdictional provisions in the event a case is techni-
cally within the Court's jurisdiction but nonetheless does not
truly constitute a serious crime of concern to the international
community. Any interpretation of this provision that goes be-
yond excluding fairly de minimis conduct would undermine the
jurisdictional regime of the Statute.
Allowing the Court substantial flexibility in the types of
cases it can adjudicate also enhances its ability to accomplish a
267. See supra Part II.A.1.
268. See supra notes 107, 111 and accompanying text.
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range of important goals. In particular, enabling the Court to
cast a broad net supports the critical deterrence objective. This
approach also leaves room for other potentially significant goals,
however. For example, the Court might have an opportunity to
prevent mass atrocities by trying those responsible for the war-
time assassination of a single important political or religious
leader. The task of prioritizing the Court's objectives is not an
element of the gravity threshold determination, but rather an
important component of the discretionary consideration of grav-
ity in selection decisions as discussed below.
C. Relative Gravity as a Criterion in the Selection of Situations
and Cases
The Prosecutor claims that in making selection decisions he
considers all of the gravity factors 'jointly," without assigning a
particular weight to any of them, and that he acts independently,
impartially, objectively, and without discriminating.269 This ap-
proach conforms to the conventional wisdom that prosecutorial
legitimacy requires objective, impartial selection decisions.27 ° In
fact, however, such objectivity is impossible for the ICC Prosecu-
tor because, unlike domestic prosecutors, his mandate is not sim-
ply to prosecute all violations of the law above a de minimis
threshold, but rather to select among a wide array of potential
situations and cases those that most merit the Court's attention.
This task requires not only determining what the ICC's goals
should be, but also prioritizing among those goals. The chal-
lenge is particularly acute in these early years of the Court's exis-
tence because there is as yet little agreement about the institu-
tion's goals or the appropriate priorities among them.27
Thus, unlike gravity threshold decisions, which can be made
by a relatively straightforward application of the factors de-
scribed above, discretionary relative gravity decisions generally
require a more complex analysis. Certainly, a small number of
decisions may be amenable to a simple factor-based analysis be-
cause they reside at either end of the gravity spectrum. A case
can be ruled out easily when it involves a low-level perpetrator of
269. Draft: Criteria for Selection, supra note 35, at 1-4.
270. See Danner, supra note 190, at 537.
271. See generally Mirjan Damaska, What Is the Point of International Criminal Justice?,
83 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 329, 330, 339 (2008) ("Current views on the objectives of interna-
tional criminal courts are in disarray.").
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an isolated, insignificant crime and the selection of a high-level
perpetrator for genocide is equally uncontroversial from a grav-
ity perspective. For such cases there is likely to be little disagree-
ment about the alignment between gravity and the ICC's goals-
the Court was created to deal only with serious crimes and the
prevention and punishment of the worst crimes by the most se-
nior perpetrators is certainly among the Court's top priorities.
However, the question of relative gravity is rarely susceptible
to such objective decision-making.272 The Prosecutor does not
simply select cases at the very top of the gravity spectrum and
reject those at the very bottom; he makes most of his decisions in
the middle. The majority of cases that present themselves as via-
ble prosecutorial options (e.g., evidence and defendants are ob-
tainable) will score high on some of the gravity factors and lower
on others. In those cases, the Prosecutor must decide which fac-
tors and goals he considers most important. In so doing he will
often be prioritizing the legitimacy perspectives of some audi-
ences over others.
For example, in declining to investigate the British soldiers
in Iraq, the Prosecutor explicitly prioritized the number of vic-
tims273 over other factors such as the fact that the crimes were
(arguably) committed as part of an aggressive war.2 74 This deci-
sion appears to privilege the legitimacy perspective of powerful
Western States. The decision also suggests the Prosecutor does
not view deterring wars of aggression as an important goal for
the ICC, although this may change when a definition of aggres-
sion is added to the Statute.
In contrast, in deciding to focus the Court's resources on
attacks affecting a relatively small number of peacekeepers in Su-
dan, the Prosecutor subordinated the number of victims to the
impact of the crimes.2 75 Again, he appears to privilege the per-
spective of Western States that engage in most peacekeeping
missions over that of local populations who may well question
why the rape or murder of hundreds in their village is less press-
272. See Greenawalt, supra note 203, at 654-55.
273. See generally Moreno-Ocampo, Letter Concerning Situation in Iraq, supra note
152.
274. See, e.g., Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International
Criminal Court, supra note 59, at 10.
275. See Moreno-Ocampo, Speech at the London School of Economics, supra note
165, at 5.
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ing for the Court than the killing of a small number of
peacekeepers. In making this selection, the Prosecutor asserts
that the Court has an important role in supporting and encour-
aging peacekeeping worldwide that can take precedence over
the goal of punishing larger-scale crimes against locals in a par-
ticular situation.
In charging Thomas Lubanga with recruiting child soldiers
the Prosecutor appears to have prioritized the impact of the
crime-the use of child soldiers is a widespread and under-ad-
dressed problem-over the nature of the crime-murder and
rape are presumably more serious. In fact, the recruitment of
child soldiers has not always been a crime under international
law, and remains legal in some domestic systems. This decision
signals that the Prosecutor views the Court as playing a role in
norm proliferation. The Court's purpose is not simply to punish
those most responsible for the worst crimes, but to transmit a
message regarding crimes that have not always received ade-
quate moral and legal condemnation.
Finally, the Prosecutor has announced a policy of selecting
cases in a situation that reflect the "main types of victimiza-
tion. ''2 6 This diversity of victimization is not a gravity factor at
all, but rather reflects a willingness to subordinate gravity alto-
gether in service of the goal of addressing the needs of as many
victims as possible, and perhaps, creating a reasonably complete
historical record.277
The Prosecutor's decisions to prioritize ICC goals in these
ways do not reflect a consensus in the international community
about such prioritization. As such, the decisions are fundamen-
tally subjective. The Prosecutor must decide whether in his view
a case involving a large number of victims is more important that
one involving a very high-level perpetrator with a particularly
heinous intent, or one involving a traditionally underprosecuted
crime, or one involving few direct victims but a substantial envi-
ronmental impact.
By requiring the Prosecutor to prioritize among potential
goals, the Rome Statute places much of the responsibility for de-
termining the Court's impact and legitimacy on the Prosecutor.
276. Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 157, at 5-6.
277. Interestingly, the Prosecutor has disavowed the latter goal. See, e.g., Draft: Cri-
teria for Selection, supra note 35, at 11.
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Kevin Heller illustrates the magnitude of this task by proposing a
fairly dramatic reconceptualization of the ICC's role. Heller sug-
gests that the Prosecutor should stop focusing on mass atrocities
in favor of situations involving systematic, government-perpe-
trated, and "socially alarming" crimes such as torture and disap-
pearance.278 According to Heller, such situations are inherently
graver than those involving mass atrocities. 279 This vision of the
Court's role differs quite dramatically, however, from the cur-
rent paradigm, which places significant weight on the numbers
of victims in a given situation. Even assuming Heller's approach
has normative merit, its adoption by the Prosecutor would likely
cause a legitimacy crisis at the Court since most audiences-
global, state and even local populations-assume the Court will
follow in the footsteps of prior international criminal courts,
each of which addressed mass atrocities.28 °
One way to take some of this legitimacy burden from the
Prosecutor is to enhance the judicial review of prosecutorial se-
lection decisions. Heller argues that the judges should be al-
lowed to review any prosecutorial decision not to pursue a situa-
tion based on gravity.281 As Heller acknowledges, however, a lit-
eral reading of the Statute does not permit such review.28 2
Judicial review is permitted when the Prosecutor declines to pro-
ceed based on the gravity threshold, but not based on his discre-
tionary consideration of relative gravity. Furthermore, the Court
does not have access to all information relevant to making selec-
tion decisions, and providing the judges such access might be
incompatible with defendants' rights.
Another solution might be for the Assembly of States Parties
to take a more active role in the selection of situations and/or
cases, for example through a standing committee that could pro-
vide guidance to the Prosecutor or make certain decisions in
consultation with his office. One author has even suggested a
system of deference to political organizations such as the Secur-
278. See Heller, supra note 64, at 24-27.
279. See id. at 31.
280. While some audiences, particularly in the Global South, would welcome an
approach that targets "systematic" crimes committed by Western governments, a signifi-
cant shift in expectations would be required to make such an approach legitimate for
many audiences.
281. Heller, supra note 64, at 31-34.
282. See id. at 31.
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ity Council for certain prosecutorial decisions. 2 3
Such possible mechanisms for reducing the Prosecutor's le-
gitimacy burden deserve further consideration. In the
meantime, the Prosecutor should be transparent about the pol-
icy choices reflected in his selection decisions. Rather than sim-
ply pointing to the gravity threshold, the Prosecutor should artic-
ulate why he is choosing to prioritize certain goals and gravity
factors over others. For some situations and cases it will be suffi-
cient to say they are the gravest by any measure. This applies
most obviously to the decision to prosecute Sudan's president
for genocide. Many situations and cases require greater explana-
tion, however.
In particular, the Prosecutor must be clear about his goal
prioritizations when he moves beyond the dominant rationales
of retribution and deterrence.28 4 These rationales generally sup-
port prosecuting crimes involving high numbers of victims and
top-level perpetrators. Decisions to pursue such cases are least
likely to provoke charges of illegitimacy. At the same time, im-
portant questions have been raised about the ability of interna-
tional courts to deter crimes,28 5 and retribution is arguably an
insufficiently utilitarian justification for international jurisdic-
tion. As such, other goals have been advanced including giving a
voice to victims, creating an historical record, helping to end
conflicts, and contributing to peace and reconciliation. Addi-
tionally, scholars increasingly promote a broader symbolic or ed-
ucative role for international trials and punishment.2" 6
Pursuing some of these less traditional goals may require
prioritizing factors other than the number of victims and the
role of the accused. For example, the ICTY pursued an expres-
sive goal by focusing on crimes of sexual violence because such
crimes have traditionally been under-prosecuted. 28 ' This objec-
tive required prosecuting at least some direct perpetrators rather
than leaders.2 88 Although the retributive goal of punishing
283. See Greenawalt, supra note 203, at 664.
284. See SLw & VAN ScR-IcK, supra note 2, at 296-97 (discussing rationales for
punishment in international criminal law).
285. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 9, at 169; Damaska, supra note 271, at 344-45.
286. See, e.g., Damaska, supra note 271; Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 39, 75-77 (2007).
287. Smith, supra note 136, at 343-44.
288. Id. at 344 (quoting Louise Arbour).
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those most responsible may not always have been met, the activ-
ity of the ICTY in this regard resulted in a substantial strengthen-
ing of the prohibition against sexual violence as a tool of war.
Similarly, the goal of fostering peace and reconciliation may
require prosecuting members of all sides of a conflict regardless
of their relative levels of responsibility. 289 As discussed above,
affected populations may consider a Court that prosecutes only
one side illegitimate. In fact, such prosecutions could actually
inflame tensions between groups rather than promoting recon-
ciliation. Also, the goal of creating an historical record, to the
extent it is an appropriate goal for an international criminal
court,2 9 will likely require prosecuting not only all sides of the
conflict, but also a range of representative crimes even if some of
those crimes are less serious than others.
When the Prosecutor makes selection decisions in pursuit of
such goals, it will be essential to the Court's sociological legiti-
macy that he publicize the grounds for the decisions. As ex-
plained above, different audiences will often have different views
on which situations and cases most deserve the Court's attention.
The Prosecutor will not be able to satisfy all audiences with each
decision. However, by communicating that he considered the
various points of view and explaining the grounds for his deci-
sions he will at least gain whatever legitimacy advantages trans-
parency can provide. Such transparency will also enable relevant
audiences to make informed judgments of the Prosecutor's deci-
sions, rather than relying on outcomes alone.
V. CONCLUSION
As the ICC seeks to establish itself as an important interna-
tional institution, one of its most pressing tasks is to develop co-
herent gravity doctrines and policies. In creating the Court,
states placed gravity at the heart of the enterprise: the Court's
jurisdiction is limited to the most serious crimes and cases of
insufficient gravity are to be rejected. The Statute's commitment
to gravity reflects a broader narrative of international criminal
289. See, e.g., ScHi-F, supra note 211, at 64 ("To promote reconciliation between
the perpetrators and victims of the genocide in Rwanda, the tribunal may need to con-
sider prosecuting Tutsi suspects for crimes against Hums, in addition to the ongoing
prosecution of Hutus.").
290. Damaska suggests this goal is generally inappropriate for international crimi-
nal courts. See Damaska, supra note 271, at 340-42.
GRAVITY AMD LEGITIMACY OF THE ICC
law that envisions such law as appropriate for the worst crimes
and perpetrators. It was the horror of crimes in particular con-
flicts that motivated the creation of the ad hoc and international-
ized criminal courts. Now, for the first time, the gravity narrative
must be translated into an operational framework for a standing
court.
To operationalize gravity in its work, the ICC must develop
a clearer understanding of the roles gravity plays in the regime.
In particular, a distinction must be drawn between the gravity
threshold for admissibility and the Prosecutor's use of relative
gravity as a selection criterion. The gravity threshold serves as a
backstop to ensure the Court's moral legitimacy in the event the
Statute's jurisdictional provisions prove inadequate. As such, the
threshold should be used to exclude only cases of de minimis con-
duct that technically meets the jurisdictional requirements but is
nonetheless insignificant. A broader interpretation of the
threshold would undermine the Court's jurisdictional regime
and limit its impact.
Gravity's more important role in the regime is to inform the
Prosecutor's discretionary selections of situations and cases to
pursue. Such selections will generally require the Prosecutor to
prioritize certain ICC goals, and thus gravity factors, over others.
This is no small task considering the international community
has yet to adopt a unified vision of the ICC's goals or the appro-
priate priorities among them. Because the selection of situations
and cases strongly affects the Court's sociological legitimacy, it
might be preferable to relieve the Prosecutor of some of this
burden by, for example, allowing the States Parties or the judges
additional input in the process. Barring such systemic changes,
however, it is crucial for the Prosecutor to be as transparent as
possible regarding his reasons for selecting particular situations
and cases. As long as relevant audiences can reasonably differ
about the ICC's priorities, general references to gravity will be
insufficient.
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